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Accountability in Cuba and Puerto Rico
by Anthony P Maingot

Libre Asociado will enter its
fourth decade, and the Cuban
n
1991 the Puerto
RicanitsEstado
revolution
will observe
32nd
anniversary. Historically speaking, both experiments are
young. Yet they both have a
great deal to tell us about crucial
elements of Caribbean and world
politics.
Increasing the political accountability of those in power has been
the goal of political movements since
at least the Magna Carta. Whether
the issue is trial by jury, taxation
without representation, regularly
held elections, or universal suffrage,
the movements are facets of the
quest for a responsive elite and a
responsible public. This quest certainly appears to be at the heart of
the monumental changes taking
place in the USSR and parts of Eastern Europe, and it underscores the
fact that in the 20th century the
search for accountability transcends
differences in political systems.
What then can Cuba and Puerto
Rico show us about this universal
trend?

Castro's Record
For the past 30 years Fidel Castro's
record on this score has been a matter of concern. In the early stages of
the revolution "charismatic mobilization" was sociologically understandable-no matter what one's
ideological predilections. But the
notion falls short of elucidating
present practices.
During the July trial of General
Arnaldo Ochoa and six other high
officials, Castro minced no words
when he explained that the Leninist
principle of exclusive elite governance still reigns supreme on the
island. It would be nice, he told the
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Consejo de Estado, if the people
agreed with our decisions, but this
was not indispensable: "One cannot
do what public opinion believes or
asks, but what is beneficial for the
nation." If the verdict on Ochoa
were to be decided by a simple public opinion poll, Castro concluded,
there would be no need for a Consejo
de Estado.
This Castro, of course, is a different Castro from the one who consistently claimed that neither elections
nor plebiscites were needed in Cuba
because the Cuban people exercise
a daily referendum on government
actions. In a country without the
slightest pretense of a free press or
independent interest groups, much
less independent opinion polling,
Castro's assertion of Leninist principles reflects Cuban reality more
accurately than his previous claims
to an original and sui generis form
of accountability.
Castro's problem is that there no
longer exists much of an audience
for the Leninist formula of governance. One has the distinct impression that he is experiencing that
most debilitating of political ailments: isolation. A major cause of
this isolation might well be "cognitive dissonance." Holding on to a
belief system that is sharply at odds
with movements and changes occurring in the real world can bring
about psychologically disturbing
and disorienting effects. When, not
surprisingly, politicians so inclined
are unable to harmonize the world
with their beliefs, the resulting psychological discomfort spurs isolation
from that world-in-change.
The process is all too evident in
contemporary Cuba. It started years
ago when Castro prohibited Cuban
students from studying in several
Eastern European countries. They

were, he said, in danger of being
"corrupted." In 1986 the free agricultural markets were closed
because they were "corrupting" the
peasants. Today he regards perestroika and glasnost as little more than
corruptions of socialist practice.
Finally, he accuses the "internationalist" missions in Angola and
Nicaragua-to say nothing of Panama-of being riddled with corruption. The execution of four high
officials, including Ochoa, a "Hero
of the Revolution" no less, and the
virtual gutting of the Ministry of the
Interior, indicate that the anticorruption campaign is part of a dramatic shift in political emphasis.
Those who oppose this change
-withdrawal from the corrupting
world currents-appear to be falling
by the wayside. To be sure, Albanian
and North Korean leaders have survived long-term national hermeticism.
But perhaps a more suitable analogy
to the "reign of virtue" that seems
to be approaching in Cuba, is the
France of Maximilien ("The Incorruptible") Robespierre.
What is the difference between
Castro's recent discourses on Cuba's
lonely stand on principle from
Robespierre's notorious peroration
on "the two opposite genii;' locked
in combat "to determine irretrievably the destinies of the world"? And
what differences are there with
Robespierre's conclusion that "we
have to strangle the internal as well
as the external enemies of the
republic, or perish with her!"? In a
world in which Hungarian, and possibly even Soviet, observer status in
the EEC is being discussed, Cuban
puritanical hermeticism has nothing
to contribute to the pan-Caribbean
debate. History has demonstrated all
too often that reigns of virtue end as
reigns of terror.

Y

Puerto Rico's Choice
In Cuba the revolution continues to
consume its children, and no one
seems to know what the future
holds. In Puerto Rico there is a massive, multifaceted mobilization
aimed at reaching a definite decision
on the island's status by 1991. In
Cuba, Castro-and only Castro-announces every July 26 where Cuba
will be heading for at least the next
year. In Puerto Rico the people will
decide the course of the future
through a referendum.
Any choice in Puerto Rico will
involve material and psychological
costs. Two of the choices, improved
commonwealth status and statehood, raise the issue of cultural
integration. A third choice, independence, entails economic costs. In all
cases, moreover, there remains the
issue of reconciling a popular
Puerto Rican choice with an allsignificant act of Congress.
There are those who might be
smitten by the "totalitarian temptation": "let one charismatic leader
decide." Puerto Ricans, however,
have not chosen this route. They
have made their choice despite considerable disdain from much of the
intellectual world and uncertainty
concerning how the US Congress
will respond to their 1991 decision.
Compared to the shelves of
books on Fidel Castro and his revolution, there are only a few modest
volumes on the father of the Puerto
Rican experiment, Luis Mufioz
Marin. The fascination of academics
and journalists alike with revolution
goes on and on. Yet there is little
international knowledge or understanding of a revolution in constitutional doctrine and international
relations that the father of the
Puerto Rican state wrought. His

repeated calls for a "breakthrough
from nationalism:' for "flexibility":'
"adaptability;' "audaciousness;' and
for "the will to experiment, to adapt
and revise" helped prepare the
ground for the peaceful and democratic decision that Puerto Rico will
make in 1991.
Whether Puerto Ricans vote for
independence, statehood, or an
improved commonwealth status,
they will do so after one of the great
political debates of our century.
Gordon Lewis, certainly no friend of
Mufioz Marin's political formula,
struck a blow for academic and intellectual honesty when he called the
Puerto Rican debate "a magnificent
obsession." But it was more than a
debate on the type of status the
island should have; it was also a
debate on how a people, any people,
can peacefully arrive at a decision as
momentous as what their national
and international regime should be.
Attention to public opinion and
concern over accountability have
been central to Puerto Rican politics. Plebiscites, political parties
(each promoting a different status),
elections every four years, free and
unencumbered execution of public
opinion polls, and a plethora of
independent interest groups and
news media, all form part of Puerto
Rico's concept of governance. It is
not that Puerto Ricans have
invented much new in terms of democratic politics. It is, rather, they
have given new life and meaning to
timeless democratic principles.
Puerto Ricans have reminded
the world that any political system
must fundamentally be an instrument for the securing of a better life
with the greatest freedom for the
greatest number. They have also
reminded us that, since there are
various ways to achieve that goal-

some of them probably not yet even
conceived-it is important to keep
open the avenues of democratic discourse. Both principles lead to an
important juridico-political point
much overlooked in the heady postcolonial days: political independence
is a purposeful creation of positive
law. It is not a natural right but a
remedial right. True, independence
was universally and quite unambiguously accepted as the sole remedy to the wrongs of colonialism,
racism, exploitation, and general
oppression. But, logically, if these ills
can be remedied by other political
statuses, the latter clearly have equal
footing as a "right." This is so especially if they can make a case for
doing a better job of governance.
Thus no particular status enters the
1991 referendum with the aura of
being a natural or inherent right.
Each option will have to convince
the voters-in both Puerto Rico and
the US-of its overall empirical and
emotional merits.
Whether Puerto Rico's 1991 decision should be held up as the model
of self-determination is not the issue
here: the real issue is what the
Caribbean and the world can learn
from the process that led to 1991.
The days of willy-nilly imitations of a
particular "model":' Puerto Rican or
otherwise, are over.
Puerto Ricans of all political
parties have agreed on the 1991 referendum. It is a reasonable and
democratic decision that merits our
attention, understanding, and admiration. Unfortunately, since words
and not bullets will decide the outcome, the world will probably pay little attention. Be that as it may, this
indifference will not make the process one iota less significant for
those sincerely seeking more
accountability from their leaders. .
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Life (and Death): An Andean Saga
by Mark B. Rosenberg

In a country accustomed to terrorism, the impact of D'Achille's
murder was profound-perhaps
because she was a European and a
woman, or possibly because of her
commitment to environmentalism,
which even in Peru has growing support. Some wondered why she was
traveling in an extremely dangerous
district. After all, Sendero had
broadcast its intention to seize control of Huancavelica by murdering
development workers and officials.

Afflicted

bleak economy, Peru
stands as testimony to the
perseverance and depravity of humankind in the
last decade of the 20th
by violence and a
century. This dichotomy
was pervasive in the life and death of
Barbara D'Achille, a European refugee who made her home in this
Andean nation of 21 million people
after fleeing the horrors of World
War II.
As a Peruvian resident, D'Achille
became an accomplished environmental and wildlife specialist, using
Peru's print media to establish her
reputation as a professional dedicated to the preservation of the
country's rugged backlands. A regular contributor to the newspaper
El Comercio, D'Achille became the
nation's ecological conscience and
an indispensable resource on Peru
for the global network of environmental organizations such as the
20th Century Fund and the World
Wildlife Fund.
D'Achille's efforts were remarkable given Peru's extraordinary
hardships of daily survival. Government incompetence, economic
decay, and relentless capital and
human flight are set against the
backdrop of a merciless terrorist
movement, Sendero Luminoso.
Traveling through Huancavelica
on May 31, 1989, D'Achille and her
companions, according to Peruvian
press reports, were intercepted by a
group of Senderistas. The terrorists
released most of her fellow workers,
warning them never to return. But
they did not release D'Achille, ordering her to interview them on the
political visions of Sendero. She
refused. They persisted. Her body
was discovered a day later: her skull
crushed by a heavy rock.
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Unfortunately there was little
time to contemplate the larger
meaning of D'Achille's life and
death. On June 3, on a narrow
downtown street choked with Lima's
usual mix of vehicles, tricycle carts,
and people, a street vendor pushed a
dynamite-laden cart under a bus
carrying guards to the presidential
palace. Six died and 19 suffered
serious injuries. The force of the

explosion ripped a six-foot crater in
the road. Shortly after the bombing,
on June 16, a 29-year-old priest was
called out of his religious sanctuary
by passersby who, to the horror of

nearby parishioners, gunned him
down. Less than a week later, the
well-regarded 35-year-old mayor of
another town was shot pointblank in
the back as he carried fresh fruit to
his home for lunch. Sendero took
credit for the murders.
What can Peruvians do to protect themselves? One US-educated
Peruvian says logic collides with
ethics: the former dictates that terrorists must be physically eliminated. But moral and ethical values
make this response unpalatable. At
any rate, such a policy would probably be impossible to carry out under
a democratic regime.
Democracy affords the possibility for pluralist dialogue, even
among the most contentious of
forces. But its premises are unity of
purpose among groups and consensus about the rules of the game.
In Peru there is neither unity of purpose nor consensus about the rules
of the game. The administration of
Alan Garcia is in disarray, its policies
having led to the breakdown of the
economy and the dispersion of political power. In this setting institutions are giving way to violence in
the conduct of politics. The options
of Peruvians are becoming distressingly narrow. How can they
tame terrorism without sinking into
Sendero's violent agenda?
Throughout their history Peruvians have suffered and inflicted violence on themselves. Today's
calamities are the newest thread in
this historical and social tapestry.
Although we prefer stories with
happy endings, for Peru no such
ending is in sight. We must celebrate
those whose daily lives become
heroic. D'Achille and other victims
in Peru must be remembered if the
nobility of the human spirit is to survive-and eventually triumph. *

Letters to the Editor
Hemisphere welcomes letters to the editor. Letters must be typed
double-spaced, and are subject to editing for clarity and length.
Please address letters to:
The Deputy Editor
Hemisphere
Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
University Park
Miami, FL 33199
FAX (305) 554-3593
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Crisis and Carnival: Rio de Janeiro
by Elizabeth Station

,

any Borazilans woula
argue that Rio de
Janeiro has been sliding into financial,
administrative, and
moral decadence ever
since Juscelino
Kubitschek moved the national capital from Rio to Brasilia in 1960.
Events in 1988-89 seem to have
pushed the Cidade Maravilhosaeven
further towards the abyss. In September 1988, with Mayor Saturnino
Braga struggling under a 60-billion
cruzado deficit and a 142-billion
cruzado debt, Rio was declared
bankrupt. In the following weeks,
municipal health and education
workers protested shrinking salaries
and 30% monthly inflation with a
strike that paralyzed public schools
and hospitals for 162 days.
Empty city coffers and a lack of
new investment have hastened the
process of physical deterioration.
Local residents are growing so used
to the city's estimated 20,000 potholes that they baptize them with
colorful names and signposts. The
feeling of malaise seemed most
apparent just before last November's
municipal elections. Disillusionment
with corruption and old-style politicians led many Cariocas to indicate
"Macaco Tiao" a belligerent chimpanzee from the Rio zoo, as their
preferred candidate for mayor.
The people of Rio de Janeiro traditionally make a heroic effort to
abandon their troubles during the
holidays, but this year forgetfulness
was harder to come by than usual.
Just days before Christmas, the brutal assassination of rubber tapper

I
Elizabeth Station is a free-lance
journalistin Rio de- Janeiro.
J
... --- ..
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Chico Mendes in faraway Acre sent
shock waves through the local ecology movement. Next, on New Year's
Eve, 55 tourists drowned when an
overloaded and unseaworthy pleasure boat, the Bateau Mouche IV,
sank at the entrance to Guanabara
Bay. Closer to the shore, the legendary girl from Ipanema had to think
twice before taking a dip at the
beach of the same name. According
to the weekly magazine Veja, 460
tons of untreated sewage and hundreds more of toxic industrial
wastes are dumped into Rio oceans
daily, rendering both the sand and
the sea unsafe.

Carnival Endures
Reeling from the punches, Rio de
Janeiro raised its head in February
to face the last Carnival celebration
of the decade. "Carnival is the only
serious thing left in Brazil," a hardcore reveler told TV Globo on the
eve of the four days of festivities,
and so it would seem. The top escolas
de samba, or neighborhood samba
clubs, begin training for the preLenten event as early as August.
Handsomely paid and highly professional carnavalescosdesign elaborate
costumes, sumptuous floats, and
catchy choreography to illustrate
the club's theme song (sambade
enredo) for the annual parade.
Neighborhood entrepreneurs, politicians, and bicheiros (who run the
numbers racket) put up the capital
to underwrite each club's entry in
the pageant. Meanwhile, two or
three thousand club members
scrape together the money for their
costumes, calledfantasias,and steel
themselves for endless rehearsals.
The spectacular two-day parade
by the 18 biggest and wealthiest
samba clubs helps Rio, despite its

difficulties, to remain the tourist
and media mecca of Brazil. In 1988
Carnival was marred by heavy rains
and landslides that left nearly 300
dead around the state. This year the
dearth of funds for public-works
projects meant that shoring up the
city against a similar disaster would
be impossible. The fear the rain
might return, coupled with the realization the public hospital shutdown
would deny emergency services to
any accident victims, added to the
verge-of-apocalypse feeling among
already melodramatic Cariocas.
The opening minutes of this
year's parade provided television
viewers all over Brazil with high
drama. Spectators gasped when in
the opening minutes of the spectacle, a faultily-constructed float carrying 52-year-old beautician Neusa
Monteiro collapsed and she plummeted headfirst onto the pavement.
In a typical show of Carioca excess,
Monteiro had planned to parade in
full regalia with 15 different samba
clubs. She had rented a special bus
to tote her costumes to the samb6dromo and a motorcycle to ferry
her between points of the parade.
After Monteiro was rushed to one of
the city's few functioning hospitals,
traumatized TV announcers provided up-to-the-minute reports on
her condition. (When she died of her
injuries two weeks later, her daughters promised not to sue the
builders of the float.)
The rest of the marathon continued without further incident and,
arguably, without a great deal of
emogao, or biting political commentary. One club, Unidos da Ponte,perfunctorily performed an
environmental samba that lamented
urban air pollution, the burning of
the Amazonian forests, vanishing
wildlife, and destruction-for-profit.

The Acadimicos do Salgueiro, a club
that traditionally treats racial
themes, delivered a not-too-angry
assessment of black Brazil 100 years
after abolition ("My samba takes away
pain and bringsjoy/Yes, I'm black/
liberty andpoetry"). Sao Clemente, one
of the only samba schools of the
white, middle-class Zona Sul,
paraded to protest Brazil's obedient
payment of its foreign debt. Club
members dressed as coffee beans,
bananas, and petroleum-all
national exports-intoned a boisterous samba that decried the
declining terms of trade for Brazilian products on the world market.
"I cry, I shout, and I speak because I
love my country," bumped and wiggled Sao Clemente. "The only thing
they can't export is the people's hope to be

happy."
Just before eight in the morning
on Fat Tuesday, when all but two of
the escolas de samba had sung and
danced their way to the end of the
runway, a weary crowd blinked and
stretched and waited for Beija-Flor
of Nil6polis to appear. An expectant
air hung over the concrete bleachers
of the samb6dromo. For two nights
fans had witnessed a lavish display
of glittery, ostentatious costumes
and towering, Disneyesque floats.
Yet Beija-Flor the club that had
sparked controversy when it introduced such luxury into the
spectacle over a decade before, had
announced a puzzling title for its
1989 theme. In "Rats and Vultures,
Let Go of My Costume," carnavalesco

Joaozinho Trinta promised to
"let the grandeconfusao between
luxury and poverty shine." Months
before he had announced plans to
unleash the"common people of the
street today-beggars, alcoholics,
street kids, lunatics, and the unemployed," as the protagonists of
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Beija-Flor'sentry in the parade.
The result was a cleverly calculated blend of popular art, excellent
music, and stinging social criticism.
Hundreds of convincingly shabby
sambistas, dressed in tatters and garbage, opened the parade singing
"In life I'm a beggar/But I'm king of
carnival."A mob of toothless bag
ladies gleefully danced around a
float crowned by a gigantic Christ
figure swabbed in black plastic. Evoking the famous Corcovado statue
that symbolizes Rio de Janeiro, the
monument's outstretched arms
protected a horde of ragged street
boys and afavela school. Next came
deranged, Dickensian madmen,
followed by fat, decadent popes
and bishops and politicians on
the take.
Further along, atop a float
depicting a "beggar's banquet," the
rich savored tempting delicacies
while the poor pulled decomposing
scraps of food out of trash cans at
the bottom. Later, a scantily-clad
mulata gyrated on the highest tier of
a towering fountain, while barefoot
street urchins romped in the spray
of water below. An enormous, tattered banner invited the crowd to
join the march of the disenfranchised: "People of the street: Pull
the remains of luxury from the garbage of this immense country....
Make your costumes and come
along to the grand masked ball." The
spectacle was moved along by a
throng of men and women wearing
the orange cotton smocks of Rio
garis, or garbage collectors and
street sweepers.

Joaozinho Trinta, the cherubic,
grey-haired genius responsible for it
all, triumphantly brought up the
rear. Celebrating his own humble
origins as a northeastern migrant
and shop clerk as much as the everyday heroism of the underpaid public
servant, Trinta wore a gari smock as
he sprayed the bleachers with water
from a street sweeper's hose. He
later explained that the hose symbolized the need to wash away decay
and corruption in Brazil. "I made an
invitation for this country to
change;' said Trinta. "The huge
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opening parade of the miserable
showed the country as it is. Then
came opulence, which demonstrates
the reason for the misery."
Such comments linking luxo
(luxury) and lixo (garbage) have
won Trinta notoriety. In 1976, angrily
defending Beija-Flor'sunprecedented use of expensive, flashy costumes and floats in that year's
Carnival parade, Trinta snapped
"the people like luxury; misery
is for intellectuals." The statement
helped earn him the enmity of the
Brazilian left, who accused Trinta of
designing sambas that exalted the
dictatorship. Trinta refused to keep
his controversial opinions to himself. "Those who know the samba
clubs also know, for example, how
hard it is to get a black man to dress
up like a slave," he remarked.
"That's what he is all year long, of
course. For Carnival he wants to
come out as Louis XV, a Dutchman,
a king."
This year's performance forced
the intellectuals to forget their feud
with Trinta, and left and right began
to heap superlatives upon him
before the last sambista stepped off
the stadium floor. "Beija-Florcompletely changed the aesthetic of
Carnival," glowed the conservative
O Globo. Fernando Gabeira, a 1970s
guerrilla who now leads the Brazilian Green Party, praised Trinta
for possessing "a more practical,
personal sense of justice than the
Socialists ... and a broader ecological intuition than many ecologists."
Others claimed the history of Carnival would be divided, henceforth,
into two periods-before and after
Beija-Flo.
Two days later the revelation that
Beija-Florhad not won the samba
club contest came as a great shock.
First-place honors went to Imperatriz
Leopoldinense, a three-time champion who had performed an elegant,
noncontroversial samba depicting
the history of Brazil from independence to the declaration of the republic. Imperatriz edged out Beija-Flor
by a single point, allegedly because
one of the judges felt Beija-Flor'suse
of an African dialect in its samba de

enredo made the song inaccessible to
the audience. Skeptics remarked
that the club's second-place finish
was no coincidence. Uninvited,
Trinta had brought a giant mirror
to the samb6dromo, inspiring the
magazine Isto E Senhor to declare
"Brazil is afraid of its own reflection."
Instead of embracing Carnival as a
time to forget, Trinta used the festival to put poverty, corruption,
opportunism, and waste on center
stage.

Now What?
When the party was over, Brazil
woke up to a reality both better and
worse than the one Trinta had
painted. Rio had not flooded or
fallen into the sea, the ailing hospitals had functioned well enough to
meet demand, and, despite the city's
international reputation for violence, crime was down 20% from the
previous Carnival. Yet during the
four days of revelry, Brazil offered
exile to Paraguayan dictator Alfredo
Stroessner and 18 inmates died
when a sadistic Sao Paulo prison
warden stuffed 50 men into a tiny
cell meant for one. Inflation crept
upward despite a government freeze
on prices and wages, and Brazil
adopted its third currency revision
in three years.
Politically some bright spots
dotted the horizon. A pugnacious
former housewife named Regina
Gordilho led an anticorruption
crusade in the Rio de Janeiro city
council. Just after Carnival, Councilwoman Gordilho found and fired
388 "ghost employees," beneficiaries
of old-time patronage practices that
enabled them to collect city paychecks without working a single day
in the chambers. Organized labor in
Rio showed new combativeness during a two-day, nationwide general
strike to negotiate salary hikes in
March. Brazilians will directly elect
a president in November for the first
time in nearly 30 years. The favorite
candidate among Cariocas is veteran
populist and former governor
Leonel Brizola. His claim to fame in
Rio de Janeiro? He built the
samb6dromo. *
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War,Peace, and Music: The Guianas
by Kenneth Bilby

usic must change life
in a big way:' says
Django. "I'm learning music to call
attention to our
grievances by singing
about them. Then
others will realize what's really
happening."
Django is a young Ndjuka
Maroon, a member of one of the six
Guianese tribes descended from
African slaves who escaped from
Surinamese plantations during the
17th and 18th centuries. Now in his
early twenties, he has lived in the
coastal French Guianese border
town of Saint-Laurent-du-Maroni
since the age of two. Django is one
of several hundred Maroons inhabiting the shantytowns scattered
across the outskirts of this overseas
French municipality with a popula-

tion of roughly 9,000. In late 1986 he
watched from across the river as the
Surinamese town of Albina was
reduced to cinders, another casualty
in the bitter struggle pitting the
Maroon guerrillas led by Ronnie
Brunswijk against the military government headed by Lieutenant
Colonel Desi Bouterse. Since then
Django has been paying close attention to the plight of the more than
10,000 Maroon refugees who fled
their homes in Suriname after government forces began their massacres of Maroon civilians. Many of
these refugees, including some of
Django's own relatives, are still living in temporary camps in French
Guiana.
Kenneth Bilby, an anthropologist
at TheJohns Hopkins University,
worked with Maroons in French
Guiana between 1983 and 1987,
and during1987 played keyboards
with Local Song.
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Like many young Maroons in
Saint-Laurent, Django grew up
alongside Alukus, Paramakas, and
Saramakas, as well as his own
Ndjuka people. He belongs to the
first generation of town dwellers,
whose parents migrated from the
Maroon villages that line the interior rivers of Suriname and French
Guiana. These urban and semiurban Maroons have been busy
evolving a musical subculture much
like those that thrive in many parts
of contemporary urban Africa.
Starting in the 1970s the young
Maroons of Saint-Laurent adopted a
new drumming style called Aleke and
began to form volunteer associations. These drumming groups
could almost have been lifted from
the pages of an anthropological
monograph on life in a modern West
African city. Sporting imaginative
names and hierarchies of officers,
the Aleke bands of Saint-Laurent
were at first composed of young
Maroons from the same tribe, and
often the same clan. More recently
bands with an interethnic membership have emerged, as young
Ndjukas, Paramakas, and Alukus
come together to make music
expressing the experiences they
share.

Political Rhythms
Maroons have always used song as a
vehicle for social commentary and
criticism. When the civil war in
Suriname broke out in 1986, and
thousands of refugees came streaming into Saint-Laurent, the Aleke
bands were quick to set the traumatic
events to music. One popular song,
delivered by a leader and chorus in
the Ndjuka language and usually
interspersed with biting improvisations, went as follows: "OurSuriname

L

funeral ceremonies and Africanbased religious cults coexist with the
new sounds of dance bands using
amplifiers, imported electric guitars, keyboards, and drum kits.
Young Ndjuka, Aluku, Paramaka,
and Saramaka musicians are trying
their hands at everything from
kaseko, the contemporary dance
music of Paramaribo, to reggae,
French Antillean zouk, African
soukous, and various combinations

0
must have freedom/peace/Boutersehas
ruined Suriname."
By early 1987 the refugees themselves-who were now swelling the
Maroon population of SaintLaurent and bringing with them
tales of atrocities committed against
family and friends-were forming
their own Aleke bands. The names of
these bands made powerful statements of protest: A Gi Tjali (It
Grieves Us), Mi No Be Wani (I Didn't
Want This), and Fii Lon (Flight to
Freedom). As the carnage across the
river continued, the Maroon
enclaves of Saint-Laurent vibrated
with the defiant performances of
these bands. The targeting of
Maroon civilians by Surinamese
army patrols was provoking an
upsurge in ethnic consciousness.
Young Aleke performers came
together in a ritualistic dance, donning the abandoned loincloths and
wraparound skirts of their parents
as symbols of resistance.
The Aleke phenomenon is one
facet of a buzzing Maroon musical
subculture in Saint-Laurent. The
age-old rhythms of traditional

dance bands added their voices to
the protests of the Aleke singers.
Django, a veteran of several Aleke
groups, helped to form a mixed
Ndjuku/Aluku dance band called
Local Song in 1986. The band's
name expresses its members' desire
to counter the tendency in French
Guiana to glorify anything that
comes from afar, especially from
France, while devaluing everything
local. Although there are several
popular Maroon dance bands in
Saint-Laurent, with engaging names
such as Switi Skin, Ennymo Stars,
Lifemo Stars, and Music Explosion,
Local Song seems to be the most
vociferous about the war next door.
Among their songs are "Feti Taanga"
("Struggle Hard") and ' ungle Commando"' a blistering militant-style
reggae recounting the attempts of
Brunswijk's guerrillas to defend
Maroon civilians from persecution
by Bouterse's troops. Both songs are
in the Ndjuka language, which itself
is an act of cultural resistance. But it
was "Revolution ina Saanan," also
sung in Ndjuka, that became a local
protest anthem for Maroons suf-

of these sounds. On weekends the
nightspots frequented by
Maroons-makeshift nightclubs,
rented dance halls, and spruced-up
yards-throb with life. The crowds
are large and almost exclusively
Maroon. Not surprisingly most of
the French civil servants and the
Creole majority in Saint-Laurent
remain oblivious to the robust subterranean culture that lives and
breathes in their back yards. The
two worlds, one dominant and the
other powerless, seldom come into
meaningful contact.
It was not long before the electric
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fering the effects of war in 1987 (see
box, p. 10).
Although Local Song has never
been inside a recording studio, cassettes of live performances have
been informally copied and circulated within the Maroon community.

By late 1987 even Ndjuka and Aluku
children could be heard singing
"Revolution ina Saanan" as they
played in shantytown alleyways.
Django, it seems, was succeeding in
his goal: his musical message was
getting across.

Bouterse and the Maroons
The music of Django and others like
him gives voice to the indignation
and frustration of a victimized and
disenfranchised people. Those in

power have yet to persuade most
Maroons that the long history of discrimination against them is ending.
The vast majority of Surinamese
Maroons were not represented in
the November 1987 elections that
took place in their country, since
they were either cut off from the
coastal region or stranded in refugee camps in French Guiana. Judg-
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ing from the sentiments expressed
by the Aleke singers and Maroon
dance bands of Saint-Laurent, the
political coalition that won could
not have counted on much support
from these people had they been
able to vote.
Although Bouterse's own party,
the Nationale DemocratischePartij,
was soundly defeated in the elections, many, if not most, Maroons
suspect the new government still
takes orders from the military. Their
suspicions are supported by allegations, widely reported in Dutch
newspapers such as De Volkskrant
and Het Parool,that the civilian
authorities have been unable to act
against the wishes of Bouterse.
Brunswijk, the rebel leader, has
made repeated overtures to the
new government, but until recently
Bouterse has vetoed all attempts to
begin serious negotiations. It has
been alleged that the civilian government is "powerless to defy Bouterse"
(The Washington Post,January 4, 1989).
Little wonder then the Bouterse
government has failed to make
amends for the slaughtering of

Maroon civilians and the massive
destruction of property that have
taken place since 1986. There are
indications, however, that this situation may be changing, as the desire
for a nonmilitary solution continues
to grow in Paramaribo (The Miami
Herald,July 23, 1989).
Django and his companions belong to a great Afro-American tradition of musical protest. They and
thousands like them in other parts of
this hemisphere are the anonymous
counterparts of famous social critics
such as Bob Marley, The Mighty
Sparrow, and Stevie Wonder. They
share with these artists a common
creative urge, a cultural penchant
that runs as deep as the long drums
of Aleke. Their political critique is
driven by a musical impulse that has
time and again proven its remarkable capacity to endure. As long as
Django and the Maroon people he
represents have legitimate grievances, their anger will not be
silenced. Any government in Suriname interested in restoring harmony would be well advised to lend
them an ear. a
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Two Plans, No Solution
by Edgar Ortiz

treasury secretary Nicholas
Brady is a palliative to two
kinds of Latin American
threats: widespread debt
repudiation and political
instability. Mass uprisings
and the electoral victories of populists Carlos Andres Perez in Venezuela and Carlos Menem in
Argentina underscore such threats.
The specter of such challenges in
neighboring Mexico is particularly
troubling to US policymakers.
In many ways the Brady proposal
breaks new ground. First, it urges
private banks to reduce their debt
portfolios, ease the interest burden
of debtor countries, and absorb
much of the cost of both. Second, it
calls for active efforts by the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to promote debt
relief. Third, it recognizes the debt
crisis as a politicalissue by linking
US national security to sociopolitical
conditions in the debtor countries.
This recognition potentially opens
the way to negotiations between
lender banks and debtor countries
that integrate criteria of economic
growth and social welfare.
Yet the Brady proposal-even as
modified by the July accord between
Mexico and its foreign creditors-is
fundamentally flawed. As its Mexican critics point out, no such plan
can be successful unless it focuses
on the structural causes of the hemisphere's debt crisis.

EdgarOrtiz is professor offinance
and economics at the Universidad
NacionalAut6noma de Mexico and
the Centro de Investigaci6ny
DocenciaEcon6mica.

Mexican Reactions
Mexico is one of several debtor
countries that have proposed similar measures in recent years. Since
1985, when the price of oil plummeted, Mexican officials have maintained that lenders should share
with borrowers the responsibility for
the debt crisis. President Carlos
Salinas de Gortari stresses that economic recovery should be based on
domestic savings, but that without a
substantially reduced debt load, his
programs of economic readjustment
cannot succeed. These two suppositions underlie not only his team's
international debt policy but its
domestic "Economic Growth and
Stability Pact":' which Mexican business, labor, and peasant representatives have pledged to support.
Hence the lenders should ease debt
payments as a catalyst to Mexican,
and by extension Latin American,
economic recovery.
Mexican officials and leaders of
the private sector thus look kindly
on the fundamentals of the Brady
plan. Their responses to its specific
measures, however, have ranged
from cautious optimism to hostile
criticism. On the optimistic side are
the Treasury Ministry, the National
Association of Manufacturers, and
the Coordinating Council of Entrepreneurs. The unknown ingredient,
they maintain, is whether private
lenders and multilateral institutions
will support the plan. The July "new
plan" only marginally addresses this
doubt, as the extent and form of
support by private banks is unclear.
Expressing criticism are elements of the public sector, labor
groups such as the National Federation of Labor Syndicates, the Cardenista wing of the Institutional
Revolutionary Party, and opposition

parties like the Popular Socialist
Party and the Mexican Socialist
Party. They object to the Brady
plan's emphasis on loan conditionality, debt payment, and debt
swaps. They also object to its vague
handling of debt-market exchange
and, even as modified by the July
accord, its inadequate debt reductions and incentives to private
lenders.
On the subject of conditionality,
critics observe the Brady plan
diverges almost imperceptibly from
previous US policy. It requires
debtor countries, under close supervision by the World Bank and the
IMF, to continue opening their borders to free trade and foreign investment, while imposing wage and
salary discipline and trimming their
public sectors. Detractors of the
Brady plan point out that these
requirements, along with the
emphasis on debt payments, compromise the sovereignty of Mexico
and other Latin American nations
and divert both financial and
human resources from the task of
national development.
Perhaps more widely opposed
by Mexicans is the Brady plan's
emphasis on debt swaps. Their
opposition revolves around several
factors: the negative impact of debt
swaps on foreign reserves and inflation (based on the conversion of
dollars to pesos); the relative success
of the government's heterodox
adjustment program that (partly
because of the large accumulation
of foreign reserves) has lowered
Mexico's rate of inflation; and the
fact that since 1986 debt swaps in
Mexico have amounted to $6.9
billion, or about 56% of total foreign investment.
The high volume of debt swaps
has contributed to the decline of
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Mexico's foreign reserves from $15
billion in 1988 to, according to some
estimates, as low as $3.5 billion in
1989. This volume indicates, moreover, that the debt-swap alternative
in Mexico is nearing exhaustion. In
any case recent experience suggests
that Mexico's stabilization plans
should aim for high volumes of foreign reserves and limited debt
swaps.
The question of market
exchange is also crucial, since
debtor nations seek to exchange
their debt at current market prices.
This would lead to a major debt
reduction of 67% for Mexico. As for
Brazil and Argentina, the two other
mammoths of Latin American debt,
it would mean a reduction of 73%
and 82%, respectively.
Mexico's program of economic
readjustment requires that its yearly
debt outlays be slashed by at least
50%. This reduction, however,
would not guarantee economic
recovery in Mexico or elsewhere
without complementary renegotiations of the terms of international
trade and technology transfer. The
Brady plan's original goal of 20%
debt reductions, and even the new
plan's goal of a 35% reduction in
principle on Mexico's privately held

foreign debt, would bring little benefit to Mexico or any other debtor
nation.
Although the new plan proposes
the lowering of interest rates, doing
so is at the option of the banks, and
eventual rises in interest rates would
erase the gains of debt reduction.
Further, Mexico and other debtors
would need financial resources
beyond those resulting from debt
reductions. Yet the Brady initiative
does not mention specific tax incentives or regulatory changes that
would lead private banks to make
available such resources. The July
accord, insofar as it provides for
new loans at lower interest rates,
essentially piles new loans on top
of old ones.

Will Things Get Better or Worse?
Although leading business sectors
and high government officials in
Mexico consider the Brady plan a
fair, if vague, proposal for debt
relief, the critics must be taken seriously. At best the plan's initial and
revised versions would ease Mexico's
debt burden, and probably that of
other Latin American countries, for
just a few years. As such they can do
little more than recent bailout pro-

grams, which have simply added
more wood to the fire.
As things stand, we can expect
either debt repudiation in the short
run or a more profound debt crisis
in the long run. Future generations
will pay for the mistakes of today,
such as substituting runaway borrowing for sound taxation in Latin
America and postponing reductions
in US domestic and foreign deficits.
There are alternatives, however.
The Brady plan could play a significant role if it were revised to call for
greater reductions in the debt burden of Mexico and Latin America.
Yet even the increased reduction
proposed in the new plan is not
enough, especially because of the
weak incentives for banks to support
the reduction. North Atlantic political leaders and bankers must recognize the need for structural reforms.
What we need is a comprehensive
approach to the debt crisis, which
stresses equitable terms of international trade and technology transfer.
Such an approach could serve as
the basis for establishing broader
accords for international development and social welfare. From the
standpoint of Mexico and Latin
America, anything less is doomed
to fail. .
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Argentine Prospects
by Enrique Loncan

Argentina's GDP has plummeted from 6.7% to 0.4%,
and its rate of poverty has
leaped from 76% to an estimated 30% of the nation's
1979 annual
growth in
population.
Can Carlos
Menem's administration reverse the
economy's decline and forestall mass
unrest and political instability?
In asserting his leadership
Menem named to his cabinet a combination of moderates from within
and outside the Peronist ranks. One
of Menem's shrewdest moves was
to appoint as minister of economy
Miguel Roig, former vice president
of Bunge y Born, an Argentine multinational that is traditionally a
scapegoat for Peronist resentment.
Following Roig's death on July 14,
Menem appointed in his place Nestor Rapanelli, a former chief executive of Bunge y Born. These two
appointments allayed the widespread fears within the business sector of a resurgence of traditional
Peronism. So did the appointment
of Domingo Cavallo, an economist
inclined to the promotion of export
trade and improved relations with
the US, as minister of foreign
affairs. Still another key appointment was that of Italo Luder, a
Peronist, as minister of defense. As
interim president in 1975, Luder
played a key role in mobilizing the
armed forces against domestic subversive activity. His credibility with
the armed forces promises to ease
tensions between the government's
civilian and military wings.
Not to be overlooked is that
Menem's overtures to business and
the military have taken place in a
context of political splintering

Since

Enrique Loncan is a lawyer and
economist in Buenos Aires.

within the opposition Radical Party.
The electoral loss by the Radical
Party and the divergent views
between ex-president Alfonsin and
defeated presidential candidate
Eduardo Angeloz have resulted in
intraparty divisions, which widen
Menem's margin for political
initiative.

and union demands will be
addressed through concessions in
social services.
* Financial pressure on agriculture
will be eased, yet the sector will
continue to subsidize the rest of
the economy.

The Economy: Is There Hope?

This scenario does not promise
quick recovery, though the initial
signs give reason for qualified optimism. Menem's most urgent challenge is to implement the unpopular
measures that, while necessary to
stop Argentina's hyperinflation,
could quickly erode his political capital. Menem's early policies indicate
he is prepared to take the political
risk.
On the political side, then, the
following policies can be anticipated:
* Assertion of presidential authority
over union bosses and the leader-

After selecting the non-Peronist,
orthodox Roig as economic minister,
Menem declared that Roig's program would be based on a neoKeynesian econometric model developed by American Nobel laureate
Lawrence Klein. This and other
points of inconsistency raise fundamental questions. Will the Menem
administration pursue an economic
policy of traditional Peronism? Or
will it pursue a modified policy, at
least during the current economic
emergency? Can either approach
gain the confidence of investors and
reactivate the economy?
Menem has surprised doubters
and supporters alike by embarking
on a disciplined course of austerity.
Among the likely economic policies
are these:
* Foreign investment will be favored,
particularly in the export sectors.
* Existing industries will receive substantial protection.
* The public sector will be reduced
only marginally, and limited privatization of public enterprises will
take place.
* Fiscal reform will be introduced.
* The foreign debt will be a source
of friction, but not rupture, in
international relations.
* Interest rates will remain high, but
flexible, subsidized credit lines will
be created to support small and
medium enterprises.
* Wage measures will be restrictive,

A Call for Realism

ship of the Justicialista Party.
* Improvement of Menem's relations
with the military as a safeguard
against the possible resurgence of
subversive activity.
* Promotion of a constitutional
amendment to reduce the presidential term of office from six to
four years, but allowing reelection
and incorporating Peronist social
rights.
* A foreign policy that seeks
improved dialogue with the US.
In the midst of crisis Argentina's
electorate found in Menem an alternative to its feelings of frustration
and resignation. The new government took office with a vote of confidence as large as the hopes of the
populace. The greatest risk is not
failure, but that achievements will be
measured with a yardstick of unrealistic expectations. .
(Translatedby Hemisphere stafJ)
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Stories of Foreign Language
by John V Lombardi

n the beginning there was foreign language and culture.
"Foreign language and culture," we educators said, "will
save the US. They will bring the
US to the world and maintain
the American dream."
Our patrons looked upon our
words and found them persuasive.
Ford Foundation largess rained
down on a favored cohort of US universities and developed expertise in
international studies. Funding
through the National Defense Education Act Title VI built programs in
the less commonly taught languages.
The international education constituency thrived from the late 1950s
through the glorious 1960s, and on
into a less bountiful 1970s. By the
1980s, however, the constituency
had fallen on hard times.
What happened to our dreams?
Did we teach badly? Did we fail to
produce expertise? Or did we just
fail?

In a dangerous world, it is a defense.
It permits us to understand our
friends and our enemies. It is therefore vital to national defense. Based
on this essentially correct set of postulates, we proposed the US government create a program to bolster
the nation's language capabilities.
We watched as our elected officials
lined up to salute the flag and support the program, appropriately
called the National Defense Foreign
Language Act.

ATwo-Story Perspective
It is not obvious, at first glance, that
there are problems in the teaching
of foreign languages. Enrollment is
up, classes are full, requirements are
tougher, and everybody is talking
about foreign languages. Why then
are we worried? The answer is easy.
Let's first look at the story we used
to tell, one that worked. That story
went like this: foreign language lets
US citizens understand other
people-what they are talking
about, what they are doing, and why
they are doing it. Knowledge of foreign languages is a utilitarian tool.

John V Lombardi isprovost and
vice presidentof Academic Affairs
at TheJohns Hopkins University.
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The program was a winner. So
what happened? We learned that
some officials had used programs
for unsavory purposes and that our
colleagues overseas looked askance
at our close connection to the
defense establishment. No longer
could we tolerate the association of
language and defense.
Thus we shifted the rationale for
teaching foreign languages from
defense to education. There was
nothing inherently wrong in doing
so. Nevertheless, language programs

began competing for funds with
other worthy priorities, such as student loans and science education. In
addition we lost the crisp precision
of our original story. The new, less
convincing story goes something like
this: study foreign language to learn
about the world, to become disciplined, and to reassert US competitiveness in the world market.
With rare exceptions, however,
studying foreign language as we do
in US universities teaches less about
the world than a one-semester
course on Latin America. Likewise it
requires a minimum of two to four
years of study before our students
achieve the requisite facility to
appreciate foreign literature. A
decent course on great works in
translation would do a better job of
educating our students. As for
teaching discipline, a semester of
ROTC would do it much more
quickly and effectively.
Perhaps the greatest fraud of all
is the notion that learning foreign
languages can make the US more
competitive. True, we would
improve our access to the Japanese
market if we learned more about the
Japanese and employed some people
in our firms who spoke passable
Japanese. So why were we so competitive in the fifties and sixties? Why
did US cars, radios, electronics, and
heavy equipment set the international standard? Did more people at
General Motors speak Spanish? Did
IBM officials discuss the virtues of
their technology in fluent Japanese?
Of course not. Competitiveness is a
function of quality and price. Language allows us to talk about competitive products, but it does not
make the products more
competitive.
All of this would be more tolerable if we actually taught students

who are not language majors to
speak another language. The truth is
we rarely do so. We give our students a little grammar, a little vocabulary, and some inadequate training
in the language laboratory. We then
send the fortunate few to a good
program abroad. If they work hard
and avoid other Americans, they
return speaking passable German,
French, Spanish, or whatever as a
result of their immersion in the culture, not as a result of our university
curriculum.
We the educators are to blame.
We know how to teach foreign language, but we refuse to do it right.
Why not? Because doing so would

Because competency testing throws
a scare into most literature establishments. After all, it is based on
the academically unpopular notion
that language is a relatively straightforward skill. The results of such a
test might lead us to reallocate
money away from the fourhundredth rectification of the
meaning of the "Quijotesque" in
Cervantes's minor novellas.
Deans and other sensitive
administrators have not given up,
however. They have called for the
use of competency testing and the
creation of think tanks for the development of language instruction.
One such think tank operates at The
Johns Hopkins School for Advanced
International Studies. Its dedicated
instructors of language are busy
with subversive investigations of new
teaching methods. Complemented
by demonstration projects at participating universities, this approach
offers a test environment that may
show us the way to improved language teaching.

VOICES
FROM
LATIN
AMERICA
ate an autonomous department of
language instruction brings down
the combined wrath of literary academia. The response often takes the
form of a collaborative attack by the
chairs of Spanish, Portuguese,
French, Italian, and German departments-characters whose previous
relations resembled those of Arab
and Israeli leaders.

Writing a New Story
Why don't we put the graduates of
our language classes through a competency test to discover whether
they speak the language or not?

ORBIS BOOKS

What should educators do? We
can begin by recognizing that language requirements mean nothing
without exit-proficiency requirements. We must also recognize that
proficiency requirements cannot be
fulfilled without budgets and without rewards-pay, promotion, and
prestige-commensurate with the
task. Neither the federal government
nor private foundations should give
a dime to any international program
that lacks serious commitment to
language teaching and competency
testing. A benchmark of such commitment, and thus a high priority
for funding, are yearlong programs
of overseas study that incorporate
before-and-after testing.
Educators must listen to the
public. When people do not buy
goods there is usually a reason: the

product is too expensive, it does not
work, or both. The public does not
buy our foreign-language story
because it's too expensive, it does
not teach people how to speak the
language,
and it wastes their time. m
"
"
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Stories of Foreign Language
by John V. Lombardi

n the beginning there was foreign language and culture.
"Foreign language and culture," we educators said, "will
save the US. They will bring the
US to the world and maintain
the American dream."
Our patrons looked upon our
words and found them persuasive.
Ford Foundation largess rained
down on a favored cohort of US universities and developed expertise in
international studies. Funding
through the National Defense Education Act Title VI built programs in
the less commonly taught languages.
The international education constituency thrived from the late 1950s
through the glorious 1960s, and on
into a less bountiful 1970s. By the
1980s, however, the constituency
had fallen on hard times.
What happened to our dreams?
Did we teach badly? Did we fail to
produce expertise? Or did we just
fail?

In a dangerous world, it is a defense.
It permits us to understand our
friends and our enemies. It is therefore vital to national defense. Based
on this essentially correct set of postulates, we proposed the US government create a program to bolster
the nation's language capabilities.
We watched as our elected officials
lined up to salute the flag and support the program, appropriately
called the National Defense Foreign
Language Act.

began competing for funds with
other worthy priorities, such as student loans and science education. In
addition we lost the crisp precision
of our original story. The new, less
convincing story goes something like
this: study foreign language to learn
about the world, to become disciplined, and to reassert US compet-

ATwo-Story Perspective
It is not obvious, at first glance, that
there are problems in the teaching
of foreign languages. Enrollment is
up, classes are full, requirements are
tougher, and everybody is talking
about foreign languages. Why then
are we worried? The answer is easy.
Let's first look at the story we used
to tell, one that worked. That story
went like this: foreign language lets
US citizens understand other
people-what they are talking
about, what they are doing, and why
they are doing it. Knowledge of foreign languages is a utilitarian tool.

John V Lombardi isprovost and
vice president of Academic Affairs
at TheJohns Hopkins University.
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The program was a winner. So
what happened? We learned that
some officials had used programs
for unsavory purposes and that our
colleagues overseas looked askance
at our close connection to the
defense establishment. No longer
could we tolerate the association of
language and defense.
Thus we shifted the rationale for
teaching foreign languages from
defense to education. There was
nothing inherently wrong in doing
so. Nevertheless, language programs

a -- r ---- - -, -v
in our firms who spoke passable
Japanese. So why were we so competitive in the fifties and sixties? Why
did US cars, radios, electronics, and
heavy equipment set the international standard? Did more people at
General Motors speak Spanish? Did
IBM officials discuss the virtues of
their technology in fluent Japanese?
Of course not. Competitiveness is a
function of quality and price. Language allows us to talk about competitive products, but it does not
make the products more
competitive.
All of this would be more tolerable if we actually taught students

who are not language majors to
speak another language. The truth is
we rarely do so. We give our students a little grammar, a little vocabulary, and some inadequate training
in the language laboratory. We then
send the fortunate few to a good
program abroad. If they work hard
and avoid other Americans, they
return speaking passable German,
French, Spanish, or whatever as a
result of their immersion in the culture, not as a result of our university
curriculum.
We the educators are to blame.
We know how to teach foreign language, but we refuse to do it right.
Why not? Because doing so would
mean breaking the hammer lock
that literature has on teaching language in most US universities. Literature, which should be the greatest
incentive for language acquisition,
has become the most powerful
inhibitor of language learning.
Literature professors do not like
to teach language, which they
regard as the work of academic
untouchables. Yet they will not give
up language teaching because it
pays for literature studies. So they
hire a few dedicated language professionals, saddle them with hostile
and disinterested graduate-student
instructors, pay them a miserable
wage, and deny them tenure. When
effective language teaching does not
result, literature professors complain about the quality of the language professionals.
The mere suggestion that we create an autonomous department of
language instruction brings down
the combined wrath of literary academia. The response often takes the
form of a collaborative attack by the
chairs of Spanish, Portuguese,
French, Italian, and German departments-characters whose previous
relations resembled those of Arab
and Israeli leaders.

Because competency testing throws
a scare into most literature establishments. After all, it is based on
the academically unpopular notion
that language is a relatively straightforward skill. The results of such a
test might lead us to reallocate
money away from the fourhundredth rectification of the
meaning of the "Quijotesque" in
Cervantes's minor novellas.
Deans and other sensitive
administrators have not given up,
however. They have called for the
use of competency testing and the
creation of think tanks for the development of language instruction.
One such think tank operates at The
Johns Hopkins School for Advanced
International Studies. Its dedicated
instructors of language are busy
with subversive investigations of new
teaching methods. Complemented
by demonstration projects at participating universities, this approach
offers a test environment that may
show us the way to improved language teaching.

VOICES
FROM
LATIN
AMERICA

What should educators do? We
can begin by recognizing that language requirements mean nothing
without exit-proficiency requirements. We must also recognize that
proficiency requirements cannot be
fulfilled without budgets and with-

out rewards-pay, promotion, and
prestige-commensurate with the
task. Neither the federal government
nor private foundations should give
a dime to any international program
that lacks serious commitment to
language teaching and competency
testing. A benchmark of such commitment, and thus a high priority
for funding, are yearlong programs
of overseas study that incorporate
before-and-after testing.
Educators must listen to the
public. When people do not buy
goods there is usually a reason: the
product is too expensive, it does not
work, or both. The public does not
buy our foreign-language story
because it's too expensive, it does
not teach people how to speak the
language, and it wastes their time. .

H. McKennie Goodpasture
CROSS AND SWORD
An Eyewitness History of Christianity in Latin America
Raul G6mez Treto
THE CHURCH AND SOCIALISM IN CUBA
Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer
WAR AGAINST THE POOR
Low-Intensity Conflict and Christian Faith
Guillo Girardi
FAITH AND REVOLUTION IN NICARAGUA

ORBIS BOOKS

Convergence and Contradictions
James Brockman
ROMERO
A Life
Donna Whitson Brett/Edward T. Brett
MURDERED IN CENTRAL AMERICA

The Stories of Eleven U.S. Missionaries
Emilio F. Mignone
WITNESS TO THE TRUTH

The Complicity of Church and Dictatorshipin Argentina

Writing a New Story
Why don't we put the graduates of
our language classes through a competency test to discover whether
they speak the language or not?

Andrew Reding
CHRISTIANITY AND REVOLUTION

Tomds Borge's Theology of Life
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Insider briefs on people and institutions
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

El Compadre Wins Big
inBolivian Elections
Carlos Palenque, popularly known
as "El Compadre," led CONDEPA
(Concienciade Patria)to victory in
the department of La Paz and to a
fourth-place finish nationwide in
the May 1989 presidential election.
His victory in La Paz was remarkable considering CONDEPA's many
handicaps. The party was founded
only eight months before the election. Its candidate, Palenque, was
accused of having close ties to
cocaine king Roberto SuArez, and
his widely watched television station
was closed down by the government.
CONDEPA's showing was enough to
elect Remedios Loza, popularly
known as "La Comadre," as deputy of
La Paz. For the first time an Indian
woman, who still dresses in traditional garb, will sit in the national
congress.

The Feeling IsMutual
In the last episode of the Elliott
Abrams-Jim Wright story, former
assistant secretary of state Abrams
called the (now ex-) Speaker of the
House ".impossible." In an exit interview with the Washington Post (June
4), Wright gives his own version.
According to the Post, Wright was
"pleased" his peace efforts on Central America won him the "enmity"
of the Reagan administration.
Wright even cited a date, November
13, 1987, when his diplomacy got
"under the skin" of Abrams. On that
day Wright opened his office to
Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega
as well as to contra leaders.

Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
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For Your Calendar

Economy by Fax

The annual Miami Conference on
the Caribbean will be held November 28-December 1. Billed as a
"town meeting on the Caribbean":'
the gathering features leading
Caribbean, US, and Canadian officials involved in bilateral and multilateral trade. Last year, Caribbean/
Central American Action, the conference's sponsor, made a special
effort to involve Far Eastern trade
representatives. An even higher profile can be expected at this year's
meeting for Japanese and Taiwanese
officials, who may be looking for
new investment outlets.

Expreso, a Peruvian newspaper,
reports ex-economy adviser Daniel
Carbonetto sends advice on managing Peru's economy from Buenos
Aires to President Alan Garcia.
According to one report, Carbonetto follows lengthy phone conversations by faxing outlines of
policy measures. Although Garcia is
desperate for advice on managing
the economy, Carbonetto's ideas may
be part of the problem, not the solution. He was among the handful of
advisers who played a role in Garcia's abortive measure to nationalize
banks-regarded by many as the
major policy error of the president's
economic management efforts.

Heir Apparent?
Edward Seaga, whose Jamaica
Labour Party was defeated in the
general election of February 1989,
has relinquished his shadow cabinet's finance portfolio. Replacing
Seaga is Bruce Golding, who served
as construction minister during the
Seaga years. Golding may be the
heir apparent to lead JLP into the
21st century.

Technology Makes ItPossible
Radio Havana Cuba is sending a
friendly letter throughout the US to
market its services. According to the
missive, "at the touch of a button"
shortwave listeners can now tune in
on "moderately-priced digital
radios." "Immediate, responsible"
coverage with a "fresh look at the
world [is] available:' Thrown into
the deal are a Radio Havana Cuba
pocket calendar and a listener's
card. The address is Box 7026,
Havana.

Lima-by Night
Black humor is now helping Peruvians to cope with the nation's deepening economic and social crisis.
One example is a five-page "Beginners Guide to Peru" circulating in
Lima: "The population is about 17
million, of whom about 16.9 million
live in the capital Lima, where they
are employed selling each other
things in the street. The main products of Peru are blank cassettes, carrings [piston rings] and snacks (seafood [sic]). Lima must once have
been a very fine town-indeed every
traveler who has visited Lima in the
last four hundred years has commented on the fact. Research is
under way to find a traveler so early
[in Peruvian history] that he comments on how fine a city Lima is, but
so far he has not been found. The
capital of Lima is Miraflores [the
affluent suburb]."

I

Neither Rain nor Sleet...
Nor Tropical Heat...
You can now send express mail packages to 14 Latin American countries

for $10.75 through the US Postal
Service's international express mail.
One to three-day service is provided. Federal Express still offers
the best service to the Caribbean: at
almost twice the cost.

L

E

Southern Cone Competition

On the Move

One of the best-kept secrets about
the British is that they consume a lot
of wine-50 million cases a year.
When the Malvinas conflict ruptured Anglo-Argentine trade in
1982, thirsty Brits lost 2 million liters
per year of imported Argentine
wine. Chile is gradually replacing
Argentina as Latin America's leading exporter of wines to Britain. In

Margaret Daly Hayes is now with the
Inter-American Development Bank
as director of public affairs. Formerly a staffer on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
director of the Washington office of
the Council of the Americas, Hayes's
primary responsibility is to develop a
stronger constituency base for the
bank's president, Enrique Iglesias.

1989 150,000 cases of Chile's finest

Making the Case for Puerto Rico
"Without sustained media coverage
in the US, Puerto Rico has sometimes remained in the shadows. We
believe it's time US opinionmakers
saw Puerto Rico in a new light." So
states the Council for Puerto RicoUS Affairs, which has opened
offices in New York as a non-profit
organization. The council's board of
directors consists of notables from
the island and the US, including Fernando Agrait and Peter V. Ueberroth. A council official, Roberto M.
Soto, writes "Puerto Rico is well
positioned to increase respect and
understanding between the US
and Latin America...and is well
equipped to reinforce the struggle
for democracy and development in
the Caribbean."

A Democratizing District?
According to Mexican policy analyst
Luis Rubio, the Federal District of
Mexico is an anomaly in the nation's
constitutional structure. Although
the district comprises 25% of Mexico's population, its administrators
are not elected officials. Rubio suggests a phased transition to the
direct election of the district's
mayor, or regente.

will be sold in Britain. The March-

April 1989 US embargo on Chilean
fruit has encouraged Chilean
growers to convert their orchards
and fruit yards into vineyards. But
looming on the horizon is the EEC
of 1992, which may exclude the
import of non-EEC wines.

Try It,You'll Like It
Beleza Tropical: Brazil Classics I
(Fly/Sire Records, 1989) is getting
hot reviews in the US. The pop
music collection features some of
Brazil's best musicians, including
Gilberto Gil, Chico Buarque, and
Maria Bethania.

SELA Via
SELA (SistemaEcon6mico Latinoamericano)permanent secretary Carlos Perez del Castillo
announced in June a proposal to
reduce the nominal value of Latin
America's external debt by 50%. Two
hundred billion dollars in commercial and official debt would be converted into long-term, low-interest
bonds, thus reducing annual debtservice transfers by up to 75%.
SELA called for a ceiling of 5% on
debt-related international interest
rates.

Stephen A. Quick, of the Congressional Joint Economic Committee,
has written "Mexico's Macroeconomic Gamble." Available
through the Columbia-New York
University Consortium on Latin
American Studies, the paper examines Mexico's new approach to economic stabilization and the odds of
its success. The author suggests
there are "few precedents" for success in the country's efforts.

Jeanne Robinson is the executive
director ofJamaica's new privatesector initiative on education, the
ICWI Group Foundation. A former
science educator, Robinson directs
the foundation's efforts to develop
educational programs on business
applications of science and technology. The ICWI Group is a consortium of insurance and finance
companies from throughout the
Caribbean.
Aaron Williams is the new director
of AID for the Eastern Caribbean.
Headquartered in Barbados, Williams is in charge of operations that
extend to Trinidad, Guyana, and
Suriname. His experience with AID
in Costa Rica and Haiti should serve
him well.
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Brazil: Fire in the Forest
by Anthony W.Pereira

uch has been said
about the dimensions
and consequences of
the rapid deforestation of the Brazilian
Amazon, but little
discussion has

addressed its fundamental causes.
Rarely mentioned are the origins of
the problem in Brazil's agrarian policies of the last 50 years. Understanding the policy origins of Amazonia's
deforestation is crucial to the
search, in Brazil and worldwide, for
ways of harmonizing demands on
the environment with the need to
implement programs of sustainable
development. The matter of agrarian policy is equally important in
drawing attention to another overlooked issue: the role of conflict over
land reform in Brazil's continuing
transition from authoritarian to
democratic governance.

Policy Origins of Agrarian Crisis
Contemporary agrarian policy in
Brazil emerged during the country's
Estado Novo (1937-45), a period of
authoritarian rule and state centralization. During the EstadoNovo,

Anthony W.Pereirais a doctoral
candidatein government at Harvard
University.
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Brazil's state leadership, agro-export
elites, and nascent industrialists
forged an alliance that promoted
the restricted unionization of industrial workers but favored the powerful rural oligarchy by excluding
rural workers. This arrangement
went unchallenged until the late
1950s, when rural labor organizations and a supporting cast of
priests, students, lawyers, politicians, and communists began to
demand land and labor reforms. But
the military regime installed in 1964
silenced these demands by imprisoning, torturing, and killing peasant
leaders, and by replacing the officials of rural trade unions with quiescent substitutes. After the 1973-74
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and 1979 oil shocks, a skyrocketing
foreign debt exacerbated Brazil's
agrarian problems by intensifying
the state's commitment to largescale export agriculture.
During most of the military
period (1964-85) the value of agricultural production grew, albeit at a
pace much below that of the rest of
the economy. Agricultural growth,
which centered on exports such as
cocoa, oranges, soybeans, and
sugar, was based on the commercialization of large estates, or latificndios. This process involved vigorous
state intervention in all phases of
production and marketing, including research on seeds and planting
techniques, the expansion of road
II UIll

U
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and utilities networks, and the subvention of exports through favorable exchange rates and guaranteed
prices. Particularly important was
the provision of cheap capital
through a network of state banks;
from 1968 to 1978 rural credit
increased fivefold in real terms.
As the owners of latifitndios
purchased machinery, fertilizer,
pesticides, and other inputs, the
academic debate over whether the
latifcndio was capitalist or feudal
died out. Clearly the latificndio was
capitalist, and large landowners
severed "feudal," patriarchal ties
with the peasantry as if to prove it.
Among the landowners involved
were cattle ranchers, whose
expanded holdings included vast
tracts cleared purely for speculative
purposes. As a result, in the
mid-1980s an estimated 737 million
acres of arable land lay uncultivated. Peasants, who were often
unable to obtain credit or other
forms of state assistance, became
displaced as land was concentrated
in the hands of a few.
The displacement of the rural
A
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poor was a prime consequence of
agrarian commercialization. As tenants, sharecroppers, and small
farmers lost land, the ranks of the
agrarian proletariat grew. Yet, in the
absence of adequate job opportunities on the modernized estates,
the rural poor tended not to stay in
the countryside but to seek employment in urban zones. For this reason, between 1970 and 1980 the
number of rural poor increased by
no more than 4.3%: some 30 million
people exited the countryside for
urban shantytowns in Sao Paulo,
Rio de Janeiro, and other cities.
Given the export focus of commercialization, another negative
consequence was that Brazil's food
production for the domestic market
decreased. Small farmers producing
staples such as beans, rice, manioc,
and corn lost either their land or
government resources. Thus from
1977 to 1984 food production for
the domestic market fell by 10%,
even as agricultural exports
increased.
Still another negative consequence brings us back to the ques-
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tion of migration. As indicated by
satellite photos of rain-forest fires,
the cities were not the only destination for rural migrants. Beginning
in the 1970s landless peasants began
to stream into Amazonia. Although
the Instituto Nacionalde Coloniza(,do
e Reforma Agrdria (INCRA) began

granting titles to Amazonian land,
millions of people-encouraged by
government slogans and traveling on
government-built roads-arrived to
clear rain-forest land without official sanction. Eighty percent of settler farms fail because of the poor
rain-forest soil. Nevertheless the
migration continues, especially to
western Amazonia. The reason is
simple: 10 to 12 million peasants
are landless.
Clearly the settlers cannot be
blamed for wanting to eat. Moreover
they are only one of many causes of
deforestation. There are, for example, the hydroelectric dams, such as
Xingu, Tucurui, Altamira, and
scores of others in the planning
stages. The Grande Carajas pig-iron
furnaces, which burn charcoal
made from local wood, cause the
annual loss of 73,000 acres of forest.
Extensive additional damage is
caused by lumber operations and
mining projects, as well as by export
agriculture and the expansion of
cattle ranches. The "development"
policies of the Brazilian state, from
economic planning and the provision of infrastructure to fiscal subsidies and the maintenance of law
and order, stand at the center of this
agrarian transformation. Because
these policies predate the economic
crisis of the 1980s, Brazil's foreign
debt of $124 billion can share only
part of the blame for their existence.
For the rural poor the upshot is that
such policies push them into a desperate quest for survival.
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Worsening rural inequality has
not gone unprotested. In 1983 a
national campaign for land reform
was initiated, spearheaded by the
9.7 million-member Confederagao
Nacional dos Trabalhadoresna Agricultura (CONTAG), the Comissdo
Pastoralde Terra of the Catholic
Church, and the ConfederagaoNacional dos Bispos do Brasil.But relations
deteriorated between CONTAG and
the Church groups, and the campaign made little headway with
potential urban allies, such as labor
unions and leftist parties. A ruralurban alliance is politically crucial
because Brazil is 70% urban and
most of the migration to cities is
probably irreversible.
Lower and middle-class city
dwellers would benefit from agrarian reform, since it promises to
increase the number of farms producing for the internal market and
to reduce the cost of food. Nonetheless, despite the high volume of
migration from the countryside,
there is faint urban recognition of
this linkage, and awareness of it
could not possibly compete with
political concern over urgent problems such as employment, housing,
crime, and public services. Another
potential urban benefit is that agrarian reform could lessen the influx
of rural migrants into the painfully
swollen cities. But again, like the
cities themselves, the political
agenda of urban residents is already
crowded. The political rift between
town and country has proved to be
the Achilles' heel of the agrarian
reform movement.

The 1985 Reform Proposal
Following the March 1985 death of
President-elect Tancredo Neves,
shortly after he won the electoralcollege vote in Brazil's first election
of a civilian in 25 years, Vice Presi-

dent Jose Sarney, a long-time supporter of the outgoing military
regime, assumed the presidency. Trying to establish his credibility as a
democratic reformer, Sarney soon
announced a program of land
reform patterned after an aborted
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1964 land statute. In May 1985 he
proposed the granting of land to

71 million people by the year 2000,
based on the expropriation of 1 billion acres of unused and underutilized land from latificndios.
Congressional representatives of the
Partidodos Trabalhadores,the Partido
Democrdtico Trabalhista,and, to a
much lesser degree, the ruling Partido do Movimento Democrdtico
Brasileirobacked the proposal.
But Sarney's announcement provoked countermeasures. In July
1985 large landowners formed the
Uniao Democrttica Ruralista(UDR)
to oppose any program that
threatens private landholdings.
Reports by the Brazilian press and
the reformist wing of the Catholic
Church link UDR to 458 assassinations of peasants, rural workers,
indigenous people, and their supporters that took place between January 1985 and June 1987 UDR has
worked as a lobbying group as well.
Joining forces with traditional landowner associations, it pressured the
congressional drafters of the new
constitution to prohibit the expropriation of land from "productive"
estates. This constitutional measure
crippled the reform plan, since
landlords can classify any tract of
land with a few head of cattle or
some machinery as "productive"
Mounting congressional, military, and executive opposition to
land redistribution confirmed suspicions regarding official commitment
to the program. For instance, by
devolving decisions on land expropriation to state governments, the
administration further exposed the
reform to the opposition of estate
owners. At almost every step the
owners could block the process of
expropriating and retitling land.
Moreover the provision of compensation to landlords was both
expensive and bureaucratically
cumbersome. In October 1987 the
Sarney administration transferred
authority over the program from
INCRA to the Ministdrioda Reforma
Agrdria e Desenvolvimento (MIRAD).
This transfer led to unsuccessful
protests by CONTAG, which viewed

the shift as a political blow to land
redistribution.
The GuardianWeekly (Manchester,January 29, 1989) reports that by
the end of 1988 Sarney's program
had redistributed just 7% of the
projected acreage of land, and just
4% of the projected number of families had received land. In January
1989 the Sarney administration, in a
cost-cutting measure induced by
Brazil's $70-billion internal debt, formally abolished MIRAD. The agrarian reform was dead, revealing this
irony in Brazil's political transition
to civilian rule: the last military government, that of General Joao
Figuereido (1979-85), redistributed
more land than has the civilian government ofJose Sarney.

The 1989 Presidential Election
A presidential election is scheduled for November 15, 1989, exactly
a century after the birth of the Brazilian republic. The first direct presidential election since 1960, it
involves a dozen candidates and
promises to be a watershed in Brazilian politics. Its potential impact
on policies of agrarian reform and
Amazonian conservation, however, is
unclear.
A number of leftist and centrist
parties support land reform, at least
rhetorically. The position of the governing centrist Partidodo Movimento
Democrdtico Brasileiro(PMDB),
whose candidate is Ulysses
Guimaries, is ambivalent. As an
opposition party in the 1970s it was
clearly reformist. But in the 1980s,
as PMDB gained a majority in congress, its reformist commitment
weakened as many politicians from
the pro-military party, the Aliana
RenovadoraNacional (ARENA), and
its successor, the PartidoDemocrdtico
Social (PDS),joined its ranks. For
instance, of the two PMDB senators
elected in 1986 in the state of Pernambuco, one was a large landholder and sugar-mill owner who
had previously belonged to ARENA
and PDS. Such politicians were
among the large segment of the
PMDB that voted against the consti-
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tutional measure to permit the
expropriation of "productive"
estate lands.
To PMDB's left, both the Partido
dos Trabalhadores(PT), whose candidate is Luis Ignacio da Silva (known
as "Lula"), and the PartidoDemocrdtico Trabalhista(PDT), whose
candidate is Leonel Brizola, have
pledged-if elected-to enact programs of agrarian reform. The Partido Social Democrdtico Brasileiro
(PSDB), led by Mario Covas, has
pledged the same. The candidates of
these parties consider the vast tracts
of unused land in latifindios as the
chief agrarian problem and promise
to redistribute those lands to small
farmers.
What differentiates Lula,
Brizola, and Covas is not their
analyses and promises, but rather
the chance that, if elected, they will
fulfill their promises. Of the three,
PT candidate Lula has the clearest
commitment to the rural poor. More

than half of PT's 450,000 members,
many of whom are tied to the progressive sector of the Catholic
Church, reside in the countryside.
In addition the party has made
recent inroads into the rural tradeunion movement, where it serves as
a rallying point for unofficial, reformist opposition to CONTAG leadership. Finally, PT is linked to the rubber tappers and indigenous people
who seek rain-forest conservation.
Lula reinforced this link by attending the funeral of party member
Chico Mendes, the assassinated
rubber tapper and environmentalist.
It is doubtful, nevertheless, that
even a PT presidency would accomplish significant agrarian reform.
Under the constitution promulgated
in October 1988, all expropriated
land must be paid for in cash and
bonds-a formidable restriction
given the government's fiscal crisis.
Although a two-thirds vote in congress could undo this restriction,
such a vote is improbable in light of
the strong congressional representation of estate owners.
A more likely scenario is that an
incoming president would restructure the granting of licenses,

credits, and other subsidies, which
clearly favor agro-export enterprises. Because latifindios are
highly dependent on this system,
such changes could simultaneously
decrease the acreage of large landholdings and increase the incentives
to smallholders producing for the
domestic market. In recent years the
government, in another cost-cutting
measure, raised its cost of rural
credit, which flows disproportionately to latifindios. It also proposed the privatization of sugarexport transactions. A reformist
administration could take further
initiative along these lines to lessen
Brazilian agriculture's glaring
inequalities and export bias.
As for the Amazon Basin, the
electoral platforms of PT's Lula,
PDT's Brizola, PSDB's Covas, and
PMDB's Guimaraes include conservationist agendas. Typical of these
agendas is Brizola's promise to
establish a ministry of the Amazon.
Yet, unless the Brazilian economy
rebounds, no package of vigorous
reforms will prove sufficient. Especially if the economy enters into
hyperinflation, land will continue as
one of the few safe investments. Similarly a stagnant economy will continue pushing settlers into the rain
forest in search of subsistence.
Most important, the unremitting
pressure of the foreign debt will
reinforce the economy's export orientation. This pressure, moreover,
will continue stimulating the building of Amazonian dams that could
flood an area of rain forest as large
as Great Britain (The Miami Herald,
July 24, 1989). In sum, conservation
of the Amazon Basin requires not
only serious agrarian and environmental reforms but also debt relief
and a sound, domestically oriented
economy.
Agrarian reform does not
appear on the platform of the Partido da ReconstruCioNacional's candidate, Fernando Collor de Mello, who
in the spring 1989 opinion polls shot
past the leftist candidates Brizola
and Lula. As for environmentalism,
his platform merely seeks international aid to enable private Brazilian

conservation organizations to help
run national parks. In the late 1970s
Collor was appointed by the military
to serve as mayor of Macei6, capital
of the small northeastern state of
Alagoas, currently Brazil's third
largest sugar producer. As a member of congress in 1985, Collor cast
his electoral-college vote for the
right-wing presidential candidate,
Paulo Maluf. As governor of
Alagoas, his land-reform record is
among the nation's worst. Collor's
ascent in the opinion polls is fueled
by his image as an opponent of political corruption and an enemy of
Sarney. Whether or not he can sustain this image, his pledge to
reduce inflation to 3% per month
has struck a clear chord among
the electorate.

ANew Political Course?
Collor's popularity demonstrates
that issues of land reform and rainforest protection will not be decisive
in November's election. There is reason, nonetheless, for long-term optimism regarding agrarian issues. An
honest election in November and a
peaceful presidential succession
would reestablish the right of the
Brazilians to elect their president.
This right, in turn, would lay the
groundwork for permitting the citizenry to play an active role in shaping the nation's political agenda.
Achievement of the latter should be
the true measure of Brazil's transition from authoritarian to democratic rule.
The political power of the rural
oligarchy has frequently blocked the
path to democracy in Brazil. The

oligarchy defeated the 1985 land
reform and is substantially responsible for the environmental destruction of Amazonia. Yet Brazil has
become overwhelmingly urban and
increasingly industrial. If, in this
setting, electoral mechanisms can
be consolidated, then large landowners will eventually find themselves
politically isolated. It is much too
early to say good-bye to the Amazon,
or to the idea of agrarian justice
in Brazil. .
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Colonizing the Amazon
by Anna Luiza Ozorio de Almeida

cultural frontier has been
expanding into Amazonia.
Migrants from the povertystricken northeast, who in
the 1940s and '50s moved
the 1960s Brazil's agrisouthward to the Parand
coffee belt, shifted their destination
in the 1960s to the Amazonian territory of central Brazil. During that
decade the focus of resettlement was
the states of Mato Grosso do Sul and
Goids. In the 1970s the migration
moved deeper into Amazonia via the
states of Mato Grosso, Maranhao,
and Parr. In the 1980s the migratory
flow penetrated deeper into the
region, reaching westernmost states
such as Rond6nia, Acre, and
Roraima.
Not until the completion of the
1990 population census will we know
the true magnitude of this decade's
demographic growth in the Brazilian
Amazon. In the 1970s Pard led the
way in the zone's demographic
expansion, distantly followed by
Rond6nia, Mato Grosso, Acre, and
Roraima. Between 1960 and 1980
the most explosive population
growth occurred not in the rural
areas but in the urban areas of
Amazonia.
Urbanization in the Amazon
Basin occurs for two reasons. First,
agricultural commercialization,
which has given impetus to the
development of large landholdings,
has expelled many Brazilians from
their rural places of origin and from
the rural economy itself. In fact the
agricultural frontier of the 1960s,
Mato Grosso do Sul and Goids,

Since

Anna Luiza Ozorio de Almeida is professor of economics and business administrationat the Universidade Federaldo
Rio de Janeiro.
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became a zone of rural exodus in
the 1970s. Second, many of the displaced small farmers are attracted
to the Amazon's urban opportunities in activities such as government services, transportation,
retailing, and lodging, which cater
to the region's booming population.
Yet the growth of the Amazon's
rural population has also been
explosive. Hundreds of thousands
of small farmers have entered territories whose economies formerly
centered on low-density forest
extraction. Many of the farmers harvest staple crops (e.g., beans, corn,
manioc, bananas, and coffee) and
raise one or two head of cattle for a
few years, deforesting the land in the
process. Newly arriving entrepreneurs then purchase the small plots
or expel the farmers at gun point,
eventually consolidating the collected holdings into speculative
properties, large cattle ranches, or,
rarely, productive agribusinesses.
The displaced farmers move on to
new agricultural frontiers or to the
local townships that are sprouting
throughout the region.
The small farmers who are pushing-or being pushed-into Amazonia comprise the same segment of
Brazil's population that previously
moved from place to place, both
in the Amazon Basin and in other
areas. In the 1970s, for instance,
public and private colonization projects in Amazonia resettled 100,000
small farmers. By the end of the
decade, however, more than onethird of them had left their plots, as
the concentration of landownership
occurred almost as rapidly within
the colonization projects as outside
them. This pattern continues. Curiously the most successful settlers in
the projects are often the most traveled ones, having bought and sold
several parcels of land-commonly
at a profit-as they moved with the
shifting agricultural frontier. Neither landownership nor protection
from expulsion, both of which
the projects provide, has proved
sufficient to bind these farmers
to one locale.
The mobility of the small farmers

is related to the low yield, landextensive nature of their agricultural practices. Even in the colonization projects, farmers deforest
their land and abandon it after only
two or three years of harvests, and
then repeat the cycle on other land
within the same project or elsewhere. Rarely do the farmers practice techniques of land conservation, such as crop and land rotation.
Low yield, land-extensive agriculture is slow to die on the frontier,
where cheap, uncultivated land
is plentiful.
This economic logic becomes
apparent in comparing public and
private colonization projects. In the
public projects where, especially in
Para, land is cheap and plentiful,
60-70% of the deforested land lies
not fallow but abandoned. In the
private projects where, especially in
Mato Grosso, land is three times
more expensive, only 30% of the
deforested land lies abandoned. The
relationship between the real price
of land and yield per hectare suggests that the rate of deforestation
would decrease, and the rate of conservation correspondingly increase,
if the real price of land were sharply
raised.
The problem is not that simple,
however, because access to cheap
land substantially improves the

income of small farmers. Farmers
who purchase the inexpensive lands
of the public projects fare significantly better (as measured by indices
such as income per worker, indebtedness, and investment/yield ratio)
than do those who purchase the
more expensive lands of the private
projects. In both cases, though,
average earnings in the Amazon's
colonization projects are 60%
higher than those of Brazil's urban
workers.
This difference in average earnings indicates that massive migration into the Amazon region is not
likely to diminish in the near future.
As long as Brazil's economic crisis
persists, rural migrants will continue to extend the agricultural
frontier. The alternative, after all, is
to try their luck among the swelling
ranks of the urban un- and underemployed. In an economy characterized by chronic inflation, the
profitability of land speculation will
continue to pull into Amazonia the
small farmers who are expelled from
other zones by the economically and
politically powerful large landowners. Insofar as small and large
farmers alike regard land as plentiful, conservationist practices will not
be implemented and land-extensive
agriculture will continue to feed
deforestation. u
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Declarations on the Amazon
Speech on"Our Nature"
byJose Sarney, President of Brazil
Brasilia
April 6, 1989
The sum of the actions we are setting in motion today demonstrates
the intensity of our commitment to
solving the ecological problem, in
the face of both our limited
resources and the campaign of scientific falsehoods and disinformation about what is going on in our
territory.
Brazil has resisted colonial
exploitation, the exploitation of its
foreign debt and its mineral
resources, and the virulent criticism
meant to silence its rightful voice in
world affairs. The international
press has been denouncing, in
alarmist fashion, the deforestation
of Amazonia. It is not my administration that is being judged, but
rather the very process of Brazilian
nation-building. Our just indignation comes not from the president
but from the Brazilian nation. The
only thing we may be guilty of is our
insistence on being free. The international community would like us to

Press Conference
by PaiakanKayap6, Spokesperson
for the Kayap6 Indians
Washington, DC
February 3, 1988
The Amazon region is being
destroyed. Its lands and people are
being lost. The forest-the very basis
Editor'sNote: Each declarationis
based on edited excerpts of original
statements.
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allow the superpowers or international organizations to tell us how to
defend what we already accept as
our duty to defend.
We are in the midst of a transition to democracy. It is ironic that,
during all the years of darkness, the
international community was silent
about the environmental problem.
And now, with everything else, they
blame Brazil for polluting the
atmosphere.
We, who are developing, who are
underdeveloped or poor, don't have
the forces to destroy the Earth.
Sadly this tragic and infernal capacity does exist: it lies in the hands of
those who hold unbelievable atomic
arsenals of destruction. They are the
ones who are putting ozone into the
atmosphere and opening "holes" for
ultraviolet penetration. It is they
who, through millions of tons of
industrial waste, heat up the
atmosphere.
We cannot accept the developed
world's manipulation of the ecology
issue to restrict Latin America's
autonomy and progress. While we
invite international assistance, we
cannot accept conditions that
exploit both nature and the people

who suffer from the most damaging
of all forms of pollution-the pollution of poverty.
We are prepared to prevent the
ruination of the Amazon from worsening the global environment. We
are ready to discuss and find solutions as long as our right to manage
our territory and to make decisions
is respected. But the developed
world must recognize its obligation
to take similar measures-to prevent acid rain and other forms of
atmospheric pollution, to avoid
damaging the ozone layer, to end
nuclear peril, and to preserve
national forests throughout the
world.
If the world wants to help us to
preserve the Amazon, then it should
help us to reforest the damaged
areas without charging for scientific
assistance. It should transfer the
technology without cost. It should
not try to turn ecology into a business through either the foreign debt
or commercialization. Let us gather
up the stones being hurled at us and
use them to pave a path of sincerity
and cooperation. .

of Indian life-is fast disappearing.
What has happened to the
Indian? As an Indian I worry about
my people. I worry, too, about the
fate of the rain forest and the land.
Without these vital resources the
Indians of the Amazon will cease to
exist.
I went to speak with the Tucurui
Indians, whose lands are threatened
by government-built dams. To those
about to lose their homes to the reservoirs, the reaction is universally
hostile. The best agricultural land is
near the river. So is the best hunting.

Needless to say, the fishing on which
so many Indians depend will also be
eliminated. As for the Carajits
Indians, whose villages have already
been flooded, there was no one left
to ask. They had lost their land, and
thus lost everything.
We Indians are unanimously
opposed to the building of dams in
the Amazon region. We must preserve our forest, and we must preserve our cultures. Without our
forest our culture cannot survive.
And without out culture there is no
reason to live. .

(Translatedby Alan Kobrin)

Open Letter to
President Sarney
The Group of 100
April 3, 1989
We, artists and writers of Latin
America, believe the historic responsibility for the destruction of the
Amazon jungle is great, and future
generations of Latin Americans will
not forgive you for not doing all in
your power to avoid it. Our countries, and yours in particular, cannot
be absent from the decisions being
taken in the world to protect the natural patrimony of humanity.
We Latin Americans would like
to see you, for your love of national
sovereignty, defend the Amazon
from local and foreign pillages, as
well as from those who, in exchange
for an irredeemable foreign debt,
are willing to transform the lungs of
the world into a wasteland-without
even fully paying the debt!
Mr. President, we believe it is
regrettable that member countries
of the Treaty of Amazon Cooperation support Brazil in its eco- and
ethnocidal politics. If our governments are individually incompetent
to defend and conserve their ethnic
riches and the animals and vegetation of our tropical forests, then the
UN should take charge of them, and
an international court should review
and punish these crimes against
ecological integrity.
Signed by: Adolfo Bioy Casares,
Olga Orozco, Manuel Puig,Ernesto
Sdbato (Argentina);Isabel Allende,
Jose Donoso, NicanorParra(Chile);
FernandoBotero, GabrielGarcia
M6rquez (Colombia); Guillermo
CabreraInfante (Cuba);Luis Cardoza
y Arag6n, Augusto Monterroso
(Guatemala);Manuel Alvarez Bravo,
Homero Aridjis, FelicianoBijar,
Fernando Cisarman,GabrielFigueroa,
CarlosFuentes, Mathias Goeritz,
EduardoMatos Moctezuma, Ofelia
Medina, CarlosMonsivdis, Elena
Poniatowska, Ivdn Restrepo, Rufino
Tamayo (Mexico);Mario Vargas Llosa
(Peru);JuanCarlos Onetti (Uruguay);
Arturo UslarPietri (Venezuela). .

Ecological Plea to President Sarney
by Homero Aridjis (Mexico),
President of the Group of 100
June 5, 1989
There is not a writer or artist among
us who is not concerned about the
fate of the trees in his or her own
country. We also understand that to
facilitate forest survival, our compatriots must reduce their voracious
appetite for tropical hardwoods and
hamburger meat.
The issue is not to prevent development in your country, but to put
an end to the skewed relationship
between developed and Third World

nations, whereby the latter annually
export $6 billion of raw timber and
board and import $10 billion of
processed wood products. Projects
must be avoided that benefit only
those few who enjoy political and
economic power and that tend to
convert traditional inhabitants into
pariahs. Conservation and sustainable development must be emphasized.
For these reasons we, artists and
writers from four continents, back
the April 3 declaration by 28 Latin
American intellectuals.
Signed by more than 200 intellectualsfrom Africa, Asia, Europe, and
the Americas. a

Brazilian Campaign for the Defense
and Development of the Amazon
by Orlando Valverde, President
March 1989
The Amazon's deforestation is primarily the responsibility of those
groups-mainly Brazilians but foreigners as well-that have benefited
most from government incentives.
At the center of such destruction is
the government itself, which seems
to consider the criminal destruction
of the forest as an "improvement"
of the region. Likewise standing at
the center are cattle and farming
projects, lumber and mining companies, poachers of valuable skins
and furs, gold prospectors, drug
traffickers, and others who care only
about earning a profit.
Amazonia's hydroelectric potential sparks enthusiasm among those
responsible for Brazil's energy supply, who are rarely disposed to environmentalism. And not to be
overlooked are those groups that
seek to turn the Indians into a submissive, cheap labor force.
There is no doubting the legitimacy of international concern over
the catastrophic consequences the
deforestation
caus-~is causAmazonia is
of Amazonia
deforestation of

ing Brazil and the world. But the
Brazilian Amazon is the rightful
possession of the Brazilian people.
The sovereignty of the Brazilian
state over the lands within its
boundaries cannot legitimately be
called into question. It is up to us,
the people of Brazil, to repudiate
outside interference. Yet Brazil must
recognize the validity of the criticism. In fact such criticism originally came from Brazilian scientists
in Brazilian research institutes. We
Brazilians must demand from our
government a stop to the crimes
being committed against the Amazon and its people, as well as against
the entire nation.
Brazilian policy must implement
the 1978 Treaty of Amazon Cooperation, signed by all the countries of
continental Amazonia. Nevertheless,
policy for the defense and development of our Amazon must be formulatedfor Brazilians and by
Brazilians. Our Amazon is an integral part of the indivisible Brazilian
homeland. .

(Translatedby Alan Kobrin)
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Redefining Soviet Foreign Policy
by Alexei Izyumov and Andrei Kortunov

hat role does the

USSR play in the
modern world? Has
its foreign policy
contributed to fulfilling its mission?
These questions
are involved in the intense discussions of sociopolitical problems
within the USSR, as well as in the
elaboration of its domestic and international strategies for the future.
The emergence of glasnost and selfcriticism made Soviet citizens realize
that the international image of the
USSR was declining. The technology
gap between the USSR and other
industrial countries was widening,
and we began to recognize a lack of
realism in traditional domestic
appraisals of our policies in the economic and social spheres. These
problems, which the world public
was well aware of, came as a shock to
people who had long regarded the
USSR as a symbol and model of
socialism.
As has happened more than
once in the country's history, some
of the most ardent optimists
plunged into desperate pessimism.

Alexei Izyumov is seniorresearcherat
the Institute of the United States and
Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Andrei Kortunov is head of the
Sectionfor InternationalSecurity
Studies at the Institute of the United
States and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences.
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It is now claimed not only in the
West but in the USSR as well that
the nation is becoming a secondrate power, a "developing country
with an A-bomb." Self-criticism is
turning into self-castigation, and the
recognition of mistakes is turning
into a total negation of Soviet
achievements.
This nihilistic attitude is no less
dangerous than the mindless optimism of the past. Thus it is urgent
to undertake an objective and comprehensive analysis of the USSR's
role in the world, and to appraise
the strong and weak points in our
foreign-policy potential. In addition
it is important to realize the inherent limits of Soviet influence in the
world and their relationship to the
nation's economic development.

Foreign Policy and Economy
It is no secret the foreign-policy difficulties of socialist countries in the

1980s, including those of the USSR,
are intimately linked to the slowing
impetus of their economic development. The West's attempts to erode
the socialist bloc's military, political,
and ideological influence are largely
based on this fact. The interplay of
domestic economy and foreign policy has long been ignored in the
USSR. Yet a brief review of Soviet
history underscores its importance.
The dynamic development of the
Soviet economy in the 1920s and
'30s, when its rate of industrial
expansion reached 20-30% per year,

undergirded the country's growing
international prestige. This economic dynamism was dramatic in
view of the Great Depression in the
West. After World War II the West,
impressed by the pace of Soviet economic and scientific progress, began
to seriously ponder the possibility of
a socialist victory in the economic

competition with capitalism.
Nevertheless, economic dynamism alone does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the rapid
consolidation of the USSR's global
influence in the postwar years. The
USSR was not the only country forging ahead. In fact Japan and many
western European countries outpaced the USSR's economic development in the 1950s and '60s.
The success of Soviet foreign
policy in developing countries in the
1960s and '70s was only in part due
to the rapid growth of its economy.
Much more important was the surge
of national liberation movements in
the Third World, the attractiveness
of Marxist-Leninist ideology to such
movements, and Soviet military aid
to the fighting peoples. Thus the
success of Soviet foreign policy
revolved around the nation's military
power-including its budgetary
emphasis on military development
and foreign relations-and to its
social goals and catchy slogans for
the masses. For a long time, then,
the USSR carried out a vigorous foreign policy based on powerful military and ideological resources but
on a somewhat limited foundation.

This situation could not last
forever. Since the mid-1970s the
rate of Soviet economic growth has
decreased. The USSR has been falling further behind the US in the
efficient use of primary materials
and energy resources. The most telling fact, however, is the widening
US-USSR gap in science and technology, which translates into lagging
Soviet standards of living.
Soviet stagnation in production,
science, and technology has weakened the country's military capacity,
as frequently mentioned by the the
Soviet military establishment. NATO
experts-who are hardly inclined to
underestimate Soviet military might
-observe that as of the mid-1980s
the USSR was on par with the US in
only five of 20 sectors on military
technology. Equally obvious is the
negative impact of Soviet economic
problems on the international prestige of Marxist ideology, as well as on
the political orientation and influence of communist and national
democratic movements worldwide.
Thus, with perestroika in Soviet
economy and society under way, the
Western strategy of economically
wearing down the USSR acquires
particular significance. The Western
strategy is to impede and, if possible, reverse the process of perestroika, thereby frustrating Soviet
attempts to fortify the domestic
underpinnings of its international
power.

Who Gains from
"Neo-Globalism"?
Western, and above all US, attempts
to intensify geopolitical rivalry with
the USSR are another facet of the
strategy to undermine Soviet international power. The US does so by
relying on its impressive technological, commercial, and financial
advantages, as well as on its unequal
economic relations with developing
countries.
In providing aid to progressive
regimes in the developing world the
USSR cannot count on recouping
its expenditures. From an economic standpoint, such aid is simply

unprofitable. Neither is Soviet
military and economic assistance to
the developing world always profitable from a political standpoint.
In the 1980s staunch Soviet allies
such as Angola, Mozambique, and
Ethiopia began actively seeking
political and economic support from
the West. The West not only shifted
the main burden of sustaining
"political stability" in these countries
onto the USSR but managed to
derive economic benefits from this
stability. Sometimes the situation
has been ridiculous: in Angola,
for example, Cuban troops often
defended installations of American
oil corporations from attacks by
UNITA gangs financed by the

US itself.

The intended outcomes of Soviet
economic and military assistance
to developing countries are often
restricted to the period of the
struggle for power and to the first
years of the progressive new state's
existence. During the subsequent
period of economic development,
young states increasingly turn to the
West, with the expected political
consequences. Experience shows
this trend can be reversed only if the
USSR renders large-scale aid,
tantamount to the gratuitous
subsidy of the economic formulations of such countries.
These problems were less
pressing in the 1960s and '70s when
the USSR primarily supported leftwing opposition forces in developing
countries and the US was the main
guarantor of the status quo. In the
1980s the roles have changed, with
the USSR supporting the ruling
national-democratic regimes and the
US attempting to undermine them.

The US skillfully exploits the fact
that in "low-intensity conflicts" it is
much cheaper to support guerrillas
than the government. Not surprisingly, then, the concepts of "new globalism" and "low-intensity conflicts"
have become popular among US leaders. The conflict in Afghanistan is a
graphic illustration of the "economic
efficiency" of the US approach. The
US spent, in supporting the Afghan
antigovernment forces, six to eight

times less per year than did the USSR
on military operations in Afghanistan. Western estimates indicate that
approximately the same ratio of
American and Soviet expenditures
occurs in conflicts involving
Nicaragua, Kampuchea, Ethiopia,
and Angola.
Consequently the USSR bears a
much heavier burden of military aid
than does the US. According to
international statistics, in the
mid-1980s the volume of economic
and military aid to developing countries (Vietnam and Cuba included)
amounted to 1.4% of Soviet GNP,
while the corresponding US figure
was less than 0.3%.
Meanwhile, the US is campaigning to discredit Soviet aid by
pointing to its military focus, its
political "strings"' and its minimal
scientific and technical content. US
estimates show economic aid
accounts for less than 10% of the
volume of the Soviet aid to developing countries, while for the US this
figure stands at about 40%.
Thus it has become increasingly
difficult for the USSR to compete
with the Western countries in the
Third World. Direct or indirect
Soviet involvement in "low-intensity
conflicts," as well as more general
attempts to deploy the Soviet armed
forces in the Third World can only
exacerbate the difficulties.

The Soviet Response
The current shape of international
politics demands the USSR look for
new ways to repulse the global
imperialist offensive. Two options
are apparent.
The first option is that the USSR
compensate for its weakening
economy by increasing its budgetary
allocations to foreign policy and to
the military, which implies "holding
the position at any cost until the
reinforcements arrive." The second
option is that of rejuvenating the
economy and thereby buttressing
the economic foundations of foreign
policy, that is, "retreating to the
earlier position in order to cut losses
and gather strength."
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Until the replacement of the
nation's leadership in 1985, the first
approach characterized Soviet
foreign relations. It attempted to
compensate for domestic stagnation
by implementing a vigorous foreign
policy. Inevitably this approach
produced stagnation in the Soviet
economy, society, and politics, and it
restricted the success of Soviet
foreign policy. Since 1985, however,
the second, and more realistic,
approach has been coming to the
fore. The final choice, nevertheless,
has yet to be made. In this respect it
is advisable to examine the possible
consequences of these alternatives.
First, it is hardly possible to
revert from the current "opening"
of Soviet society to the previous
mode of "Iron Curtain" secrecy.
Further, the USSR is at a decided
economic disadvantage relative to
the US, Western Europe, and Japan.
NATO's economic indices are 2.5
better than those of the Warsaw
Treaty Organization, while the
indices of NATO and Japan
combined are 3.2 times better. The
West, moreover, has access to the
growing economic reserve
represented by the "new capitalist"
countries emerging from the
underdeveloped world. The USSR
has access to no such reserves.
Second, the economy's limitations require that the nation's leadership clearly define Soviet economic
interests abroad and examine the
pros and cons of international initiatives. In other words, Soviet foreign
policy must introduce the criteria of
"cost-accounting" and "self-financing." In particular the gratuitous
subsidizing of some of our Third
World allies should be replaced by
aid linked to programs designed to
make them more economically viable. Perhaps socialist countries
should establish an organization
similar in purpose to the IME
Establishments of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance, for
instance, could be useful.
Third, Soviet foreign policy in
the underdeveloped world must systematically counter US attempts to
entangle the USSR in new conflicts,
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thereby saddling the USSR with
additional commitments and further
scattering its resources. The USSR
needs to adopt a doctrine that allows
it the room to step back from potential new Third World commitments
in the interests of restructuring its
economy and making more attractive the socialist path of development. Along the same lines the
USSR needs to become more cautious and pragmatic in identifying
its geopolitical interests and goals
throughout the world, the purpose
being to harmonize its actions with
the country's economic potential
and international priorities.
Fourth, not only MarxistLeninist theory but also recent history contradicts the notion that the
USSR must deploy its armed forces
to "counteract imperialist expansionism"' In the 1960s-the period of
most rapid development of national
liberation movements and socialist
ideology in the Third World-the
Soviet armed forces did not perform
this role. In contrast, by the
mid-1970s, when the Soviet military
did assume the role, the Third World
unequivocally swung towards capitalist development.
Socialism neither can nor should
be a "guarantor" of those regimes in
developing countries that do not
enjoy widespread social support and
are unable to defend themselves.
Attempting to be such a guarantor
involves the wasting of scarce
resources and the discrediting of
the Third World regimes in question. In the final count, moreover,
the outcome of the competition
between socialism and capitalism
will be decided not in Nicaragua or
Afghanistan but in the world's centers of socialism and capitalism.
The USSR's mistakes in the
underdeveloped world have been
costly. Glasnost in foreign policy is
the primary guarantee that the
USSR will avoid such mistakes in
the future. .

Editor'sNote: Edited version of an
articlepublishedin the Soviet journal
International Affairs, no. 8 (1988).
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Perestroika and Central America
by Rafael Angel Calder6n

about increased contact
between the USSR and
Latin America. Soviet foreign minister Schedvardnaze's tour through
Latin America in the fall of
1987 and the Moscow visits of Presidents Raul Alfonsin of Argentina in

inclination to promote class struggle
and "revolutionary" violence. A
principal obstacle to detente and
peace in Central America and the
Caribbean is the Cuban government's Marxist orthodoxy. Cuba's
orthodoxy rejects perestroikaand
considers the new era of detente an
opportunity to continue pursuing

Gorbachev's statements, in his
book Perestroika,cause considerable
anxiety among Central Americans.
For example, when he writes, "We
sympathize with liberation movements ... ," is he referring to Soviet
support for movements like El Salvador's Farabundo Marti Front for
National Liberation? Similarly, when
cnIIPr 1e hat "... what has hap-
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actors of Central America and the
Caribbean continue to be immersed
in the dialectics of the Cold War, and
the Marxist governments of the area
are not yet employing the language
of perestroika. The peoples of Central America are anxiously observing
the contradiction between Gorbachev's "new thinking" and Fidel
Castro's "old thinking:' between the
former's inclination to negotiate
regional conflicts and the latter's
RafaelAngel Calder6nis the presidential candidateof the PartidoUnidad
Social Cristianaof Costa Rica.
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the strategic Soviet-Cuban alliance
intact. If Gorbachev does so, then he
likely would bet on democratization
in the USSR and hard-line regimes
in Cuba and Nicaragua. The Soviet
bloc would employ a two-prong policy, with the USSR maintaining formal state-to-state relations, while
the Cuban and Nicaraguan governments maintain informal relations
with insurgent movements in countries like El Salvador, Guatemala, .
and Honduras. In this scenario the
USSR would tone down its relations
with Nicaragua, providing military
aid indirectly through Cuba.

S.

-, .

zinski does not seem to

believe in the expansionist will of the
Soviets, although he has reason to
acknowledge the revolutionary
adventurism of Cuban and
Nicaraguan leaders.
Rodolfo Cerdas Cruz of Costa
Rica points out, "Opportunist targets will continue to be a temptation
for the CPSU [Communist Party of
the Soviet Union] leadership, but
they will probably tend to be much
more selective and to weigh up situations more realistically" (Journalof
Latin American Studies, February
1989, p. 12). Cerdas hints at some
kind of Soviet interference in the
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Until the replacement of the
nation's leadership in 1985, the first
approach characterized Soviet
foreign relations. It attempted to
compensate for domestic stagnation
by implementing a vigorous foreign
policy. Inevitably this approach
produced stagnation in the Soviet
economy, society, and politics, and it
restricted the success of Soviet
foreign policy. Since 1985, however,
the second, and more realistic,
approach has been coming to the
fore. The final choice, nevertheless,
has yet to be made. In this respect it
is advisable to examine the possible
consequences of these alternatives.
First, it is hardly possible to
-"
'~"
revert from the current "oof Soviet society to the pri
mode of "Iron Curtain" s,
Further, the USSR is at a<
economic disadvantage re
the US, Western Europe,
NATO's economic indices
better than those of the M
Treaty Organization, whil
indices of NATO and Jap
combined are 3.2 times be
West, moreover, has acces
growing economic reserve
represented by the "new c
countries emerging from
underdeveloped world. TI
has access to no such rese
Second, the economy's
tions require that the nati,
ship clearly define Soviet (
interests abroad and exan
pros and cons of internati
tives. In other words, Sovi
policy must introduce the ..........
"cost-accounting" and "self-financing." In particular the gratuitous
subsidizing of some of our Third
World allies should be replaced by
aid linked to programs designed to
make them more economically viable. Perhaps socialist countries
should establish an organization
similar in purpose to the IME
Establishments of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance, for
instance, could be useful.
Third, Soviet foreign policy in
the underdeveloped world must systematically counter US attempts to
entangle the USSR in new conflicts,
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thereby saddling the USSR with
additional commitments and further
scattering its resources. The USSR
needs to adopt a doctrine that allows
it the room to step back from potential new Third World commitments
in the interests of restructuring its
economy and making more attractive the socialist path of development. Along the same lines the
USSR needs to become more cautious and pragmatic in identifying
its geopolitical interests and goals
throughout the world, the purpose
being to harmonize its actions with
the country's economic potential
and international priorities.
Fourth, not only MarxistI
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Perestroika and Central America
by Rafael Angel Calder6n

about increased contact
between the USSR and
Latin America. Soviet foreign minister Schedvardnaze's tour through
Latin America in the fall of
1987 and the Moscow visits of Presidents Rail1 Alfonsin of Argentina in
October 1986, Julio Maria Sanguinetti of Uruguay in March 1988,
and Jose Sarney of Brazil in October
1988 have given rise to unprecedented commercial, technological,
and cultural accords. Simultaneously the Soviets have encouraged democratization, Contadora
negotiations, and "independent"
foreign policies, especially for Mexico and Argentina. Nevertheless, the
"positive" consequences of perestroika for the Soviet people, for Asia,
Africa, and Europe, and even for
some Latin American states, stand
in sharp contrast to the consequences of perestroikafor Central
America.

The Central American Challenge
As in the 1970s, detente has not
reached Central America and the
Caribbean. Indeed, the political
actors of Central America and the
Caribbean continue to be immersed
in the dialectics of the Cold War, and
the Marxist governments of the area
are not yet employing the language
of perestroika. The peoples of Central America are anxiously observing
the contradiction between Gorbachev's "new thinking" and Fidel
Castro's "old thinking," between the
former's inclination to negotiate
regional conflicts and the latter's
Rafael Angel Calder6nis the presidential candidateof the PartidoUnidad
Social Cristianaof Costa Rica.

inclination to promote class struggle
and "revolutionary" violence. A
principal obstacle to detente and
peace in Central America and the
Caribbean is the Cuban government's Marxist orthodoxy. Cuba's
orthodoxy rejects perestroika and
considers the new era of detente an
opportunity to continue pursuing
expansionism.

Unfortunately the Nicaraguan
government of Daniel Ortega has
displayed numerous signs of adherence to Cuban Stalinism. A CubanNicaraguan equation has been
formed, clinging to the traditional
dogmas of Marxism-Leninism, and
anxious to bring about new military
victories. Further, Gorbachev's visit
to Havana in April 1989 revealed
that Soviet leadership is disposed to
tolerate Castro's revolutionary
intransigence as a means of keeping
the strategic Soviet-Cuban alliance
intact. If Gorbachev does so, then he
likely would bet on democratization
in the USSR and hard-line regimes
in Cuba and Nicaragua. The Soviet
bloc would employ a two-prong policy, with the USSR maintaining formal state-to-state relations, while
the Cuban and Nicaraguan governments maintain informal relations
with insurgent movements in countries like El Salvador, Guatemala, .
and Honduras. In this scenario the
USSR would tone down its relations
with Nicaragua, providing military
aid indirectly through Cuba.

Gorbachev's statements, in his
book Perestroika,cause considerable
anxiety among Central Americans.
For example, when he writes, "We
sympathize with liberation movements ... "' is he referring to Soviet
support for movements like El Salvador's Farabundo Marti Front for
National Liberation? Similarly, when
he assures us that "... what has happened in Nicaragua demonstrates
what can be expected to happen in
other countries;' is he expressing
sympathy towards the formation of
new Nicaraguas in Central America?
Such statements, as well as Soviet
military aid to Nicaragua and to the
Salvadoran insurgency, have led to
skepticism regarding the spread of
perestroikato countries bordering
the Caribbean. In The GrandFailure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century (1989),
Zbigniew Brzezinski writes, "In the
near future, Communism may have
better prospects in Central America
and perhaps Mexico than elsewhere.
Marxist-Leninists there can take
advantage of the anti-American,
nationalist, and radical impulses of
significant portions both of the
local intelligentsia and peasantry"
(p. 222). Brzezinski does not seem to
believe in the expansionist will of the
Soviets, although he has reason to
acknowledge the revolutionary
adventurism of Cuban and
Nicaraguan leaders.
Rodolfo Cerdas Cruz of Costa
Rica points out, "Opportunist targets will continue to be a temptation
for the CPSU [Communist Party of
the Soviet Union] leadership, but
they will probably tend to be much
more selective and to weigh up situations more realistically" (Journalof
Latin American Studies, February
1989, p. 12). Cerdas hints at some
kind of Soviet interference in the
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Panamanian crisis: "The Soviets
appear to be preparing ... for a possible settlement in Central America,
with the Panamanian situation ...
now working in their favor."
Along the same lines, US analyst
Irving Louis Horowitz mentions
increased Cuban participation in
Latin American military activities
following the Angolan accords,
which call for the departure of
Cuban troops from that country.
According to Horowitz, "Havana
also tends towards closer relations
with Noriega, the Panamanian
strong man, and towards active
intervention in the internal affairs
of El Salvador, Honduras and, of
course, Nicaragua" (El Nuevo Herald

[Miami], April 29, 1989).

Grounds for Optimism?
As Democrats and Christians, we
should cling to the hope that the
impact of glasnost and perestroikain
Central America and the Caribbean
will foster an ambiance of peace,
d6tente, democracy, and development. In this respect the extension
of perestroikato Central America
would initiate a number of processes: democratization and glasnost
in Cuba and Nicaragua; a negotiated settlement of the regional conflict; the suspension of military aid
to insurgents; the reincorporation
of a reformed Cuba within the interAmerican system; and the strengthening of economic, commercial, diplomatic, and cultural ties with the
Soviet Union. In such a context of
peace and cooperation, a substantial reduction in defense costs for
Cuba and Nicaragua would become
viable. The latter would allow the
Soviets to reduce their subsidies to
those countries, thereby bolstering
plans to restructure the Soviet economy. Finally, the extension of perestroika to Central America would
create a climate favorable to a
Social-Christian foreign policy,
which is dedicated to the defense of
liberty, peace, justice, and
democracy. .
(Translatedby Ruth Gubler)
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Debt, Drugs, Democracy, Central America, and the Environment 70 leaders speak out on the issues facing our Hemisphere

The Americas in 1989:
Consensus for Action
A Report of the Inter-American Dialogue
Under the auspices of The Aspen Institute

"An outstanding contribution to the policymaking process"
Rep. Lee Hamilton, House Foreign Affairs Committee
"The only sensible alternative"
The Miami Herald
"[A] model approach for foreign policy anywhere"
St. Louis Post Dispatch
The Inter-American Dialogue provides a vital channel for communication between concerned citizens from the United
States, Latin America, Canada, and the Caribbean. Consensus for Action has been hailed byleaders of both U.S. political
parties, and endorsed by newspapers throughout the United States. For policy-makers concerned with inter-American
affairs, it is required reading. For students of Latin America, it provides a concise overview of the major hemispheric
issues and concrete recommendations for tackling them.
$5 per copy paperback, $4 per copy bulk rate available for classroom use and organizations. Contact:
The Inter-American Dialogue, Suite 1070, 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036, (202) 466-6410

Hemisphere Summer 1989

:::i:::
--;::-

0

n

'

t-V

k~4FAI rii:I~Iu I~~JE I~!k~EiI 5ij ~I~!iL~ ImU W~

i~3AI

vr.,,

dE*INbfhhN^"tin.E..p

w-

Soviet
Union

United States

:=~:::::c~::~rn::;::~
:~:3 ~,,~::gr~,l::~~~,:

9

~~l~~~~~~a;~:xs,~::::~i::a:::::~~s:
:i~---~

Recipient

Total

I Soviet Union

I United States IWestern Europe IEastern Europe I

China

Others
I

E

_ossa MIca
nnmini.

rn

n Ron

I

~nc

I

__U

1n

11N

rAan

Adapted from Statistical Abstract of Latin America, Vol. 26 (1986). See graph above left.

<an

.,a

Features: Superpowers and Latin America

Bordering on Consensus: US Policy
by Gilbert W. Merkx

human rights performance of countries, an end to US repatriation of
Central American refugees, and US
support for "genuine" land reform.
Its Caribbean proposals center on
the reestablishment of US diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba
(An Alternative U.S. Policy toward

Should
its policy toward Latin
America? With the advent
of the Bush administration,
several policy associations
in the US authored proWashington rethink
posals to change Washington's relations with its southern
neighbors. The surprising feature of
these proposals is that, despite
diverse political points of departure,
they substantially converge in their
recommendations for a new US
agenda in Latin America.

PACCA
Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America (PACCA)
is an association of left-to-liberal
scholars and policymakers that
seeks "democratic alternatives" to
US regional policy. The premise of
PACCA's recommendations is that
the US has brought neither peace
nor development to the Caribbean
and Central America. In taking
issue with the national security,
anticommunist thrust of US action,
PACCA interprets the regional
crisis in terms of "sharp inequalities between poor majorities
and wealthy elites" (The Alternative in Brief,Washington, DC,

1988, p. 1).
PACCAs Central American proposals seek not only an end to US
military intervention and military
aid but support for national, negotiated solutions in El Salvador and
Guatemala and for democratic elections throughout the isthmus.
PACCA also seeks massive US-led
foreign aid contingent on the
Gilbert W. Merkx isprofessor of
sociology and directorof the Latin
American Instituteat the University
of New Mexico.
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Cuba, Washington, DC, 1988).
The political practicality and
strategic wisdom of many of these
recommendations are questionable.
Some of PACCA's recommendations
imply an expanded US role in
reshaping Central American societies and politics. Experience with
the Alliance for Progress and other
assistance programs makes doubtful
the feasibility and desirability of
such US involvement.

ATime for Choices
A product of the Inter-American
Dialogue of the Aspen Institute, The
Americas in 1988: A Time for Choices
(Washington, DC, 1988) combines
moderation and urgency in addressing the hemisphere's problems of
Central America, debt, drugs,
migration, and democracy. The
report's moderation is no surprise
given that the Dialogue comprises a
panel of prominent US and Latin
American public figures. What is
surprising is the report's urgency, as
well as the extent of consensus
between the US and Latin American
participants. A Time for Choices
expresses a collective anxiety about
hemispheric affairs, as might be
found among the officers of a ship
lost in the fog.
The document supports winding
down the Central American conflict
and favors intervention along the
lines of the Contadora and
Esquipulas initiatives, which seek
peacemaking, democratization, and

economic development. The contras
should be resettled, refugees
assisted, and foreign aid provided to
rebuild economies. On economic
questions, debt relief is endorsed as
a first step by most of the participants and a last resort by the others.
Calls are made to increase capital
flows, to stimulate economic growth
to the level of 5% a year, and for
Latin American countries to adopt
"sound" economic policies.
Regarding drugs the document
emphasizes, first, the reduction of
US demand, and second, technical
assistance to Latin American governments for drug control measures. It opposes sanctions against
Latin America and supports collaboration. It does not spell out
what collaboration means in practice, other than controlling demand
and cooperating in eradication
efforts.
Regarding migration the report
calls for improved mechanisms for
the cooperative and joint formulation of policies. It also calls for US
cooperation in the restructuring of
Latin American civil-military relations. Such cooperation would
include US investment in efforts to
strengthen civilian institutions such
as parties, legislatures, and the
courts, as well as to instill democratic values among Latin American
military officers.
A Time for Choices is boldest and
most effective in its discussion of
policy approaches in Central America. Its attention to the military
question is a refreshing addition to
the policy agenda. The discussion of
economic issues is also effective,
although the proposals for debt
relief could be stronger. The sections on drugs, migration, and the
security threat to democracy offer
more diagnosis than prescription.

Miami II
Miami Report II: New Perspectives on
Debt, Trade,and Investment-A Key to
US.-Latin American Relations in the
1990s (Coral Gables, Florida, 1988)
expresses the views of Miami civic
leaders and academics assembled by
the North-South Center of the
Graduate School of International
Studies at the University of Miami.

Unfortunately Miami II avoids
controversial political issues, such as
Cuba, Central America, and military
assistance. The report's most original feature is its emphasis on "international education," by which it does
not mean the manipulation of opinion through "public democracy,"' but
rather a genuine elevation of US citizens' understanding of Latin
America.

Sidestepping security issues,
Miami II focuses on the US's inability to understand Latin America and
to provide hemispheric leadership.
The report points to Latin America's
economy as the toughest challenge,
followed by issues of immigration,
drug trafficking, and international
education.
Miami II does not clearly state
the causes of the US's failure to
provide leadership and consistent
policies. The document implies,
however, that these causes lie less in
the policy process than in the lack of
public awareness. It attributes this
lack of awareness to poor media coverage and to "the insularity of our
educational system at the primary
and secondary levels" (p. 37).
The broadest recommendations
fall mainly outside the policy arena:
pressing politicians to define their
positions on Latin America, improving the public's understanding of
Latin America, and pushing the US
Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve to think about Latin
America. The document's basic economic recommendation-that the
US government foster an improved
investment climate in Latin America
-is what might be expected from
a group involved in international
business.
Miami II argues for an immigration policy hospitable to political
refugees and for larger Caribbean
quotas. On drugs the report proposes avoiding recrimination, studying the impact in Latin America,
and curbing US drug use. On international education it asks the US to
promote international education
and language training in the public
schools and for Congress to provide
Caribbean scholarship funds.

Mandate for Leadership III
Authored by the Heritage Foundation, one of Washington's most conservative think tanks, Mandatefor
LeadershipIII (1988) emphasizes a
straightforward national security
position: "United States global strategy is based on a secure southern
flank. Central America, the Caribbean, and Mexico, in which 131 million people live, is [sic] the most
crucial part of this flank" (p. 538).
Mandate III points to the strategic
importance of the region's sea traffic
lanes and its "vast economic potential" (p. 538).
The document praises the
Reagan administration for blunting
Soviet expansion, spurring the
spread of democratic institutions,
and in the case of Nicaragua, "preventing the consolidation of another
communist regime in the hemisphere" (p. 539). It follows this cursory praise, however, with pointed
criticisms of Reagan's policies in the
Caribbean Basin. The analysis faults
the Reagan-Wright peace plan for
undercutting contra successes and
encouraging Central American
presidents to pursue their own
peace initiatives.
MandateIII blames Latin America's economic stagnation on "socialist and statist economic policies"
(p. 542) and seeks to link economic
aid to policies that protect private
property and reduce the state sector. It also seeks a reduction in the
debt burden and in trade and tariff
barriers to Mexican and Caribbean
products.
Mandate II's policy recommendations on Cuba are the most hard-

line of all the documents in this
review. They call for the new president to unilaterally abrogate the
1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev US
agreement, which guarantees that
the US will not invade Cuba. The US
should repeatedly denounce Cuba
in international forums, pressure
Western banks to cease loans to
Cuba, stigmatize US companies that
trade with Cuba, establish TV
Marti, and support the growth of
Cuban domestic opposition.
The recommendations concerning Nicaragua are similar in
tone: MandateIII calls for giving
Nicaragua three months to take
concrete steps to "dismantle the
Marxist-Leninist structure" (p. 550).
Failing this, the US should break
relations, obtain military assistance
for the contras, and finance the
Nicaraguan internal opposition.
A contradiction between Mandate IIs indictment of Reagan's policy failures and the actions it
recommends is that the latter represent a check list of the policies
implemented by the Reagan administration in one form or another.
Insofar as the administration's Latin
American failures resulted from
such policies, Mandate IIls recommendations can only have similar
results.

Third Century
The Third Century: US. Latin American Policy Choicesfor the 1990s (1988)
reflects the deliberations of experts
convened by the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS), a
moderately conservative Washington
think tank. Third Century'spremise
is that the hemispheric problems of
US policy are rooted in the policy
process itself rather than in global
or regional developments. Thus,
"a policy stalemate in Washington"
(p. 2) has prevented effective
responses to challenges such as economic problems and the debt burden, immigration and refugee flows,
and narcotics trafficking, as well as
Soviet influence, regionalism, and
political instability.
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The report pins part of the
blame for policy stalemate on Latin
American specialists and their "irresponsible attitude" (p. 2), claiming
"moderate Latin Americanists are
few in number" (p. 3) and "hostile to
Latin American policy in practically
any form" (p. 3). Third Century recommends the creation of a "new
generation of analysts and institutions" (p. 4) to sustain the US's Latin
American policy process. Yet few
Latin Americanists played even
minor roles in the formulation of US
foreign policy under Reagan. They
can hardly be blamed for the problems of a process in which they were
not involved.
Third Century tends to avoid policy recommendations. Yet it does
call for easing the debt burden,
strengthening the international military education program and the
National Endowment for Democracy, testing the antidrug capabilities of the Organization of
American States (OAS), and facilitating the flow of foreign investment. The most decisive statements
concern Cuba: "The next president
should resist the temptation to
break with long-standing policy
towards Cuba by rescinding trade
sanctions.... The goal of regional
peace and prosperity is better
achieved by a policy that highlights
the antidemocratic character of con-

temporary Cuba" (p. 38).
Most likely to stir up controversy
isthe document's premise that the
problem with US policy toward
Latin America lies in the policy process itself. Many specialists would
argue that Latin American problems
like debt, drugs, and insurrection
stem from causes unrelated to the
conduct of US foreign policy.

Santa Fe II
Santa Fe II: A Strategyfor Latin
America in the Nineties (The Committee of Santa Fe, 1988) places Latin
American problems in the context
of a "communist conflict strategy"
that seeks to involve "Western security forces in protracted operations
simultaneously in several countries"
(p. 3), with the strategic goal of
"reducing US forwarded commitments on the Euro-Asian land mass
and thereby enhancing Soviet coercive ability" (p. 3).
Nevertheless, Santa Fe II centers
on Latin American problems that
are of hemispheric rather than
Soviet origin. It treats the Soviet
threat as an endemic disease: as the
health of the patient deteriorates,
the disease-communist subversion-will do more damage. The
document's recommendations are
designed to nurse the patient back
to health.

LACC Studies on
Latin America and the Caribbean
in conjunction with Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
LACC Studies on LatinAmerica and the Caribbean
presents new perspectives on the contemporary and
historical forces--political, economic, social, and
cultural-that shape emerging realities in the region.

Forthcoming Volumes
Heraldo Mufioz and Carlos Portales, Elusive Friendship:A
Survey of U.S.-Chilean Relations
Andrds Opazo Bernales, Social Crisis and Popular-Religious
Movements in CentralAmerica
For information, contact Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.,
1800 30th Street, Boulder, CO 80301, (303) 444-6684.
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Santa Fe II identifies several
policy problems, including debtaggravated economic stagnation,
narcotics trafficking, immigration,
statism, and debilitated hemispheric
institutions. Underlying its analysis
of Latin American politics is a
distinction between regime and
society. Democracy occurs when a
society holds its regime accountable.
When a society loses this control and
falls under the regime's sway, the
result is "statism." Santa Fe II views
Latin American statism as a cultural
inheritance with affinities to Soviet
statism. Accordingly US strategy
should counter the statist threat
culturally, such as through educational initiatives that target
bureaucrats and the military, and by
strengthening private and public
institutional bulwarks against
statism. Success in promoting
democracy (i.e. reducing statism)
will also reduce the Soviet threat.
This argument produces
innovative policy recommendations.
The section on economic strategy
calls unequivocally for reducing the
debt burden of Latin America as
the first step in reviving economic
growth. It also calls for US help in
establishing national capital markets
in Latin America, privatizing state
enterprises, revitalizing the
Caribbean Basin Initiative, and
expanding reciprocal agricultural
trade with Latin America.
Other proposals, however, reflect
a traditional concern with national
security. The report proposes to
expand military assistance to Latin
America to cope with low-intensity
conflict, to support Nicaraguan
democratization, to educate the US
media and public to the hemispheric
threat of communist subversion,
and to develop bipartisan cooperation between Congress and the
White House.
As for specific countries, the
recommendations regarding Cuba
are the most striking: negotiate
directly with the Soviet Union on its
military withdrawal from Cuba
and open talks with Castro or his
successor. In short, "the US should
signal its desire to rapidly normalize

relations with a de-Sovietized
Cuba-a normalization that would
include the dropping of the trade
embargo" (p. 33). The only recommendation at odds with this dramatic agenda is that of establishing
TV Marti.
Santa Fe I's prescriptions raise
operational questions. For example,
how would the US inculcate
democracy among Latin American
bureaucrats? Would the US support
the banning of noncommunist
"statist" parties on the grounds that
they are antidemocratic? Moreover
Santa Fe II glosses over complex
issues with allusions subject to
double meanings (e.g., "democracy"
in Nicaragua, which could mean the
installation of a counterrevolutionary regime or reforms under the
revolutionary regime).
Despite such caveats, Santa Fe II
is remarkably progressive. The
authors sum up their report as a
proactive, rather than reactive,
strategy for attacking Latin America's
problems. Proposals to negotiate
with Castro, reopen trade relations
with Cuba, relieve debt burdens, save
tropical rain forests, phase out sugar
protection, and revitalize the OAS,
are forward-looking. Santa Fe II shows
that traditional emphasis on national
security and opposition to big government can give rise to an innovative agenda.

ABipartisan Mood
What is striking about these reports
is that, in spite of the fundamental
differences in their political
premises, they present remarkably
similar agendas for US policy
toward Latin America. They agree
on the inclusion of the issues of
debt, democracy, Central America,
narcotics, and immigration. And
they agree on the need for a
bipartisan Latin American policy.
The reports devote little or no
attention, however, to the issues of
communist subversion, the Soviet
military threat, border conflicts,
population, urbanization, human
rights, dictatorship, direct foreign
investment, and nonhemispheric

(i.e. Asian) trade and investment.
Santa Fe II stands more or less
alone in emphasizing communist
subversion, Latin American statism,
and ecology.

If Santa Fe HII and PACCA's
Alternative epitomize the conservative and liberal perspectives, then
convergence towards bipartisanship
is under way. Even on US-Cuban relations Santa Fe H and PACCA's Alternative call for negotiations to lift
the trade embargo and reestablish
full relations with Cuba. Whether
the objective is to detach Cuba from
the Soviet orbit or to terminate the
counterrevolutionary bias of US

policy, the proposals are compatible.
A mood of consensus on USLatin American relations has
arrived. Has the failure of recent
policy experiments meant the
exhaustion of radical and reactionary options? Has the link
between partisanship and policy
incoherence stimulated a
reconsideration of US policy? Are
hemispheric events changing the
historic parameters that have
shaped policy, leading to greater
agreement on the definition of
issues? In any case, this is clearly
a time of creative opportunities
in US-Latin American relations. .

The Narrative of
Liberation
PERSPECTIVES ON
AFRO-CARIBBEAN
LITERATURE, POPULAR
CULTURE, AND POLITICS

Patrick Taylor
Patrick Taylor here explores the role of oral and
written traditions in the Afro-Caribbean peoples'
struggle for identity and self-determination. He
examines the works of Frantz Fanon, including his
little-known psychiatric writings.
"Taylor's book will become a landmark in
Caribbean and Third World literary/cultural studies.
His work on Fanon clearly constitutes the best
intellectual genealogy of Fanon's thought."
-Abdul R. JanMohamed
University of California, Berkeley
$29.95
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Hemispheric Controversy

Partners in Conflict: The United
States and Latin America
by Abraham Lowenthal. The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1987
240 pp. Cloth. $24.50.

Hard Choices
by Mark Falcoff
A book on US-Latin American relations by Abraham Lowenthal is
bound to be worthy of serious reading and discussion throughout the
hemisphere. This is so not only
because of the author's scholarly
expertise, which is among the highest in our profession, but also
because of his active engagement in
hemispheric affairs over many years.
Such engagement is exemplified by
his role in establishing the Latin
American program at the Woodrow
Wilson Center of the Smithsonian
Institution, and more recently his
role in the Inter-American Dialogue,
a panel of US, Caribbean, and Latin
American personalities who periodically frame policy alternatives.
Partnersin Conflict reflects this participation. The book is therefore a
valuable synthesis of a particular
approach to US-Latin American
relations, which is shared, at least
Mark Falcoffis a residentscholar in
foreign policy at the American Enterprise Institute.

Hemisphere Summer 1989

rhetorically, by important segments
of the US political and intellectual
community.
Precisely because Lowenthal and
I hold very different points of view,
let me begin by singling out some of
what I particularly like about Partners in Conflict. First, though the
book is a mere 240 pages, it is
remarkably comprehensive. Anyone
who attempts to synthesize a large
and complicated subject such as USLatin American relations deserves
much praise and sympathy. Second,
the book is moderate in tone, spirit,
and purpose. Lowenthal deliberately
distances himself from dependency
theory and the notion-still prevalent in leftist academic circles at
home and abroad-that what is
good for Latin America must always
be bad for the US and vice versa. In
fact Lowenthal assumes the opposite: that there are, or at least should
be, common interests between the
US and Latin America. (Reading
this book helped me to understand
why, not at all to his discredit, Lowenthal was recently defeated for the
presidency of the Latin American
Studies Association.)
Third, the book is admirably
detailed. While Lowenthal has a
broad philosophical approach, he
descends to the particular in chapters on Mexico, Brazil, and the
Caribbean. He successfully moves
from the general to the specific with
fluency, authority, and in many cases

a careful sorting-out of issues.
Finally, Lowenthal does not simply
criticize but offers alternatives.
While I often find myself at variance
with his interpretations, or even his
notion of the facts of the case, I am
favorably impressed by the audacity
and seriousness of the overall effort.

As the World Turns
More than a decade ago, Lowenthal
wrote an important article in Foreign
Affairs (October 1976) outlining a
new approach to US-Latin American relations. The article urged us
to abandon what Lowenthal called
the "hemispheric presumption." In
some ways this approach became the
informing spirit of the Carter
administration's policy, although in
other ways it merely stated certain
changes in the world that nobody
had bothered to catalogue. Lowenthal said then what he repeats and
develops in Partnersin Conflict: there
has been a qualitative and quantitative change in the position of Latin
American nations towards the US.
The US is no longer the sole or, in
some cases, even the principal
source of capital, technology, and
investments. Nor is it necessarily the
single most important market.
In Lowenthal's view the US, particularly the Reagan administration,
has failed to grasp this change, and
instead seeks to restore US hegemony, especially in the Caribbean

M

Basin. The US clings to an outdated
view of security interests and, to
some degree, economic interests,
focusing our concern on the stability of the new Latin American
democracies. This tendency prevents us from pursuing what for
Lowenthal should be our real interest in the region: the promotion of
prosperous, developing, nonaligned
neighbors.
In theory, of course, the US
should favor all good things and
oppose all bad things. In the real
world, however, we must make
choices based on resources and on
the outcomes we are willing to pay
for. We may no longer be hegemonic, but we are still important. In
fact, precisely because we no longer
are hegemonic, we must allocate our
policy energies and our resources
more selectively than in the past.
Why then should we abandon the
pursuit of national self-interest in
our relations with 20 or so other
nations, all of whom are not surprisingly pursuing their self-interest
in their relations with us?
This point lies at the heart of my
differences with Partnersin Conflict.
For Lowenthal the US is pursuing its
national self-interest only when it is
doing what the Latin American
nations, or rather, their leaders,
want us to do. This stance leads him
to deplore any and all differences
between Washington and the Latin
American capitals; when we are
doing what the Latins want, that is
"cooperation" (i.e. good); when we
are not, that is "confrontation" or
"conflict" (i.e. bad). I found him falling into this trap even in his discussion of US relations with Brazil during the Carter years: "First the US
government attempted, without
consulting the Brazilian government, to persuade West Germany to

break its contract to provide sensitive nuclear technology to Brazil.
Then Washington aggravated relations by heralding its human rights
policy in ways Brazil's government
found offensive. These two specific
irritants were considerably alleviated in the course of the Carter
period, but the underlying economic
conflicts continued, and the nuclear
issue also remained divisive. The
United States and Brazil were still at
odds at the end of the 1970s" (p. 129).

As I read this I found myself saying, of course this is so, and what of
it? I am not in the habit of recalling
the Carter administration with nostalgia, but if, by its lights, nuclear
nonproliferation and human rights
were high enough on its agenda, it
had every right to advance them in
its bilateral relationship with Brazil.
To be sure, this might actually harm
the long-term interests of the US,
but that would be an error of judgment, not an act of misconduct. The
fact of conflict is hardly worth deploring in and of itself; what else are
international relations made of? Differences between sovereign nations
can be avoided altogether only if one
side accepts the agenda of the other
-surely not a realistic proposal.
Lowenthal also seems remarkably insensitive to the way in which a
decline in US hegemony has deprived
the Latin American nations of their

former leverage with Washington.
In the past the close (and in some cases
even suffocating) relationship provided a climate in which successive US
administrations felt a certain sense of
responsibility for outcomes in the
Southern Hemisphere. The traditional
security rationale, which Lowenthal
discards as outdated and irrelevant,
guided both the Good Neighbor
Policy and the Alliance for Progress.
To the extent Americans, particularly members of the US Congress,
become convinced there is no
serious security interest south of
Mexico-or even north of it, for that
matter-Latin America will simply
drop off the face of the Earth.
According to the world map implicit
in the latest version of the US Foreign Assistance Act, El Salvador is
larger than Mexico and South Korea
is larger than Brazil. This is ridiculous, but then so is much of the way
the world works.
Lowenthal actually believes the
US does not fully appreciate the way
in which Latin America's prosperity
is tied to its own. He recites the
usual statistics about US jobs lost
because of the inability of Latin
American nations to purchase our
products, and more than once raises
the guarded threat of unlimited
immigration if Latin America's basic
economic problems are not
resolved. It would be easy to take
issue with both extrapolations. The
crucial points, however, seem to be
that most Latin American governments are organized to distribute
resources rather than create wealth;
most are undermining business confidence and driving native capital
abroad; most have public sectors
that consume ever larger shares of
the budget; and most are essentially
bankrupt welfare states seeking an
international bailout. These are
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realities that any US policy must
face and perhaps accept before
advancing to more ambitious
agenda.
Lowenthal recognizes many of
these things, but his analysis does
not give them their proper weight.
They are not merely aspects of a
complex situation but the centralfactors that broadly condition the international business environment and
investors' perception of Latin America. Lowenthal sees vast possibilities
in future US-Latin American economic relations. That is his privilege.
Most bankers, entrepreneurs, and
not a few members of Congress,
however, look upon Latin America
as a kind of economic black hole.
The news that reaches us daily from,
say, Peru and Argentina, does little
to counteract this image. Lowenthal
fears the growth of radical populism
and nationalism, and he sees a need
for the US to preempt both threats
with a bold and imaginative new policy. But how seriously should we take
such an eventuality? Once the hegemonic presumption has been abandoned, even the worst-case scenario
loses its sting.

Choosing Carefully
In selecting US relations with Mexico and Brazil, Lowenthal rightly
points out that the operative principles are pragmatism and a preference for settling issues on a case-bycase basis. Admittedly the results
are not always exciting and, of
course, anything can be improved
upon. But to suggest, as he does,
that somehow the best way to deal
with such countries is to subsume
our bilateral relations within a
larger Third World framework is
intolerably ambitious. Isn't the policy process in the US fragmented
and disorganized enough without
folding more countries and issues
into a larger envelope?
Moreover, Lowenthal often oversimplifies policy choices, as if they
were entirely discrete. Examples

include economic equity versus private investment, military aid versus
civilian control, "ideological plural-
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ism" versus human rights, human
rights versus nonintervention, and
promotion of democracy versus
respect for individual sovereignties.
As Anthony Lake, a former Carter
administration official, has pointed
out, in the real world principles are
often as much in conflict with each
other as with pragmatism or realpolitik. In this sense Lowenthal's
evaluation of Carter policy is
ungenerous and unfair. I do, however, applaud his willingness to
admit there are certain wellestablished parameters within
which Latin American policy
operates in the US regardless of
administrations. This is a refreshing change from the notion, so
often retailed nowadays by certain
liberal Democratic academics,
that all good things happen
under one party and all bad
things under another.
Given the unsatisfactory nature
of public life in most Latin American countries, there will always be
plenty to complain about. And given
the continuing, though declining,
role of the US as a major external
power, there will always be a temptation to assign more blame and more
responsibility to Washington than is
appropriate. But as we enter into the
fullness of the post-hegemonic age,
the importance of Latin America to
the US seems to be in danger of
becoming purely negative.
Much of Congress's enthusiasm
for "nonintervention" (or for "diplomacy'," as it is sometimes called) in
Nicaragua is a result of the impulse
towards neglect of, and disinterest
in, the region as a whole. Mexico,
because it shares a long frontier
with the US, will always get special
consideration. The rest of the
region, however, may find itself
in a curious limbo. It has wandered
too far from the US to exert much
claim upon the latter's time, energy,
and resources, but remains farther
still from anywhere else. This
is not a happy outcome for most
countries, but something more than
the admirable, controlled idealism
of Partnersin Conflict will be needed
to avoid it. .

Common Ground
by Rosario Green
Abraham Lowenthal's Partnersin
Conflict emphasizes a point that
commonly escapes US academics
and diplomats: Latin America is no
longer a backward, agro-exporting,
isolated area ruled by premodern
caudillos in need of guidance by the
Great Northern Power. As Lowenthal observes, contemporary
Latin America, despite its myriad
problems, is well on the road to
democracy, modernity, and maturity.
With this point of departure, Partners in Conflict focuses on how Washington has responded and how it
should respond to its loss of hegemony in Latin America. The answers
it provides make Partnersin Conflict
an indispensable book for scholars
and policymakers alike.
Lowenthal argues that Latin
American challenges to US hegemony-such as the Cuban and
Nicaraguan Revolutions, Venezuelan leadership in formulating
OPEC strategy, and the creation of
the Contadora Group-reflect not
only the region's maturation. They
also reflect its diminishing relative
importance as a site of US investment and as a trading partner.
How then has Washington
responded? Most basically, according to Lowenthal, by alternating
between policies of "positive" intervention, "negative" intervention,
and indifference. Kennedy's Alliance
for Progress and Carter's human
rights diplomacy fall under the first
category. Reagan's obsession with
the Caribbean Basin falls under the
second, and the Johnson and NixonFord approaches fall under the
third. Lowenthal contends that
none of the three orientations
acknowledged the loss of US hegemony, and that the traditional conception of US hemispheric interests is in
need of profound revision.

Rosario Green is a politicalscientist
at the Instituto Matias Romero, in
Mexico City.

_

_______

New Challenges, New Solutions
Lowenthal builds his case by marshalling evidence against US
analysts and policymakers who consider Latin America a region of
diminishing strategic relevance. To
begin with, Latin America is exerting growing influence on the US
economy, especially in terms of US
exports and banking. Further, massive migration, particularly from
Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central
America, is significantly changing
daily life in the US. Drug trafficking,
terrorism, environmental degradation, and nuclear proliferation in
Latin America pose escalating
threats, while the region's economic
and political conditions jeopardize
the preservation of basic US values,
such as human rights (p. 55).
With this evidence in mind, the
author turns to what he regards as
the priorities of US policy toward
Latin America: trade, finance, and
migration. Lowenthal's hypothesis is
that regional economic problems,
rather than the internal conflicts of
Central America, are the fundamental threats to the hemisphere's
security and stability. US policy,
Lowenthal writes, should "respond
to Latin America's needs" by focusing "much more on trade, finance
and migration-and less on MIGs
and guerrillas" (p. 65).
Lowenthal discusses these priorities in light of the varying circumstances of the area's subregions and
nations. This discussion interweaves
rich description with Lowenthal's
own proposals for improving interAmerican relations. What stands out
in these proposals is their moderation and pragmatism, as well as the
ethical principles on which they
stand.
Regarding Mexico, for example,
this tone surfaces in the form of
sensitivity to the country's legacy of
antagonistic relations with the US.
Lowenthal writes that US policy
must avoid not only unilateral measures but also an asphyxiating "special relationship"' both of which
could inflame Mexican nationalist
sentiment. As for Brazil, he stresses

that it is no longer simply the economic power of South America, but
rather one of the ten largest economies in the world. US policymakers
must therefore recognize that Brazil's economic and geopolitical interests are becoming more diversified
and independent, and that it possesses increasing leverage in its relations with the US.
The Caribbean Basin, in Lowenthal's view, consists of two zones,
the Caribbean islands and Central
America. Nevertheless, the US, he
says, has rooted its policy in the
notion that both zones constitute its
"third front." Consequently Washington strategists have insisted on
maintaining a high profile in the
Caribbean Basin predicated on
a diffuse concept of "national
security," which in fact manifests a
fundamental sense of "national
insecurity" (p. 155).
From Lowenthal's standpoint,
the Caribbean Basin poses only minimal threats to US security. Hence
the appropriate US policy should be
neither one of sustained or intermittent intervention, nor one of
complete withdrawal. Instead he
recommends a policy of "commitment to the economic and social
development of the nations of the
Caribbean Basin without a corresponding attempt to exercise tight
control of their internal affairs"
(p. 165). He goes on to say that this
approach would permit the US to
address its strategic interests in the
Caribbean Basin without losing
sight of its more serious concerns in
Mexico and South America.
Partnersin Conflict deserves
praise for its moderate, pragmatic
perspective on US policy toward
Latin America. But one of the book's
proposals-its call for a strengthened version of the Baker debt-relief
plan-and one aspect of the book's
analysis-its contradictory discussion of the Nicaraguan Revolution-should not go unchallenged.
The Baker plan was a novel initiative for resolving Latin America's
debt crisis. Since it failed, however,
to address the root causes of the
crisis, a bolstered version of the plan

would be no panacea for the region's
debt problems. No matter how comprehensive and well-intentioned, a
program of financial assistance
would not be enough. What the
crisis demands are a debt-relief program (even more aggressive than the
"second" Brady plan) and a largescale reform of the international
financial system that incorporates
the premises of the "New International Economic Order," that is, an
overhaul of the terms of NorthSouth economic relations.
As for the Nicaraguan Revolution, Lowenthal insists on demonstrating that it poses no threat to US
security. Nevertheless, he characterizes the Sandinista regime as
"authoritarian and repressive of
political freedom" (p. 193). To this
characterization Lowenthal adds
unsubstantiated claims, such as the
following: "Nicaragua under the
Sandinistas could harm the security
of the Hemisphere. It has supported
revolutionary movements elsewhere.... The question is not
whether Nicaragua represents a
challenge but how best to respond
to it" (p. 193). This analysis, including its policy implications, is clearly
in need of rethinking.
The fact remains that the
strengths of this book much outweigh its weaknesses. The US and
Latin America face monumental,
interlocking challenges that demand
a combination of pragmatism and
imagination. As Lowenthal asserts, a
deepening of Latin America's economic and social crisis, as well as
heightened US protectionism and
interventionism, would touch off
increased unrest, authoritarianism,
and nationalism in Latin America. A
result would be an "era of deep hostility in United States-Latin American relations" (p. 181). It is time for
us to realize that the crisis in our
relations implies risks and opportunities, and to act accordingly. At
issue is nothing less than hemispheric peace, justice, and prosperity. Lowenthal's Partnersin Conflict
points us in the right direction. .
(Translatedby Ruth Gubler)

Hemisphere Summer 1989

Perestroika and Latin America
by MarianGoslinga

ver since Mikhail Gorbachev introduced the concept in 1985, perestroikahas become the glamour word for
Soviet economic policy-domestic as well as foreign. The Soviet leader's steadfast pursuit of economic reform
not only has changed the course of East-West relations but has added a new dimension to Soviet-Latin American relations-especially where Cuba is concerned. Although Fidel Castro has chosen to deal with Cuba's economic problems by way of "rectificacibn," the course of Soviet-Cuban relations has unequivocally been altered.
This section lists publications in periodicals from 1988 to May 1989 on the impact of perestroikain Latin
America. Since previous articles and information can be located in standard reference sources, this list refers
only to the most recent literature and is not intended as a definitive bibliography.

The Beard Singed. The Economist,
v. 309, no. 7581 (December 17, 1988),
p. 43. [Editorial on Fidel Castro's
attitude towards the new Soviet
reforms.]
Castro's Cuba in Gorbachev's Era.
Carlos Alberto Montaner. Society,
v. 25, no. 4 (May-June 1988), p. 27
Castro's Gorbachev Problem:
Cuban Foreign Policy in the
Hemisphere. Carla Anne Robbins.
US. News and World Report, v. 106,
no. 1 (January 9, 1989), p. 40.
Castro: Dilemmas of the Last Idealist. Tad Szulc. New Perspectives Quarterly, v. 5, no. 4 (Winter 1988), p. 50.
[Deals with Castro's reactions to the
new Soviet reforms.]
Cuba, the Revolution: Toward
Victory Always, but When? George
Black. The Nation, v. 247, no. 11,
(October 24, 1988), p. 373.
Cuba-URSS en beneficio mfituo.
Rail Lazo. Bohemia, no. 11 (March
11, 1988), pp. 48-51. [Discusses the
economic interdependence between
the two countries and the effect of
perestroikaon this relationship.]
Marian Goslinga is the Latin American and Caribbeanlibrarianat Florida
InternationalUniversity.
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Cuba: Quarterly Situation Report.
Prepared by the Office of Research
and Policy for the staff of the Radio
Marti Program. Washington, D.C..
United States Information Agency,
Radio Marti Program. [A current
summary of events in Cuba (social,
economic, and political) published
four times a year since 1988.]
Cuban Economic Slowdown
Threatens Living Standards. Caribbean Insight, v. 12, no. 4 (April 1989),
pp. 3-4. [Editorial.]

America Latina (USSR), no. 1 (1989),
pp. 4-9. [Soviet publication on
Latin America.]
Horizontes de la cooperaci6n.
Anatoli Bekarevich. Amrica Latina

(USSR), no. 4 (1989), pp. 38-44.
[Discusses Soviet-Latin American
relations after perestroikafrom a
Soviet point of view.]
Minority Report. Christopher
Hitchens. The Nation, v. 246, no. 3

(January 1988), p. 79. [Analyzes

Cuba's reaction to glasnost and
The Cuban Economy: Too Poor for
Perestroika.CaribbeanInsight, v. 12,

no. 4 (April 1989), pp. 3-4.
[Editorial.]
Gorbachev Yields No Ground Yet.
John Felton. CongressionalQuarterly
Weekly Report, v. 47, no. 14 (April 8,
1989), p. 768. [About the domestic
and foreign opposition to

perestroika.]
Gorbachev's Greatest Challenge:
Perestroikaand the National
Question. Graham Smith. Political
Geography Quarterly, v. 8, no. 1

(January 1989), pp. 7-21.
Hacia la eficacia econ6mica:
entrevista con Laureano Le6n,
presidente de la Asociaci6n Nacional de Economistas de Cuba.

perestroika.]
Moscow Scales Back: Gorbachev
Spurs Shifts Here, There-But Not
Everywhere. Christopher Ogden.

Time, v. 133, no. 16 (April 17, 1989),
p. 32. [Since 1985 Time has given
abundant coverage to perestroika.
Here, Ogden discusses the Soviet
Union's relations with its allies, such
as Cuba.]
The Moscow Summit May Scale

More Than One Peak. Bill Javetski,
Peter Galuszka. Business Week, no.

3040 (February 29, 1988), p. 42.
El movimiento de la solaridad y la
perestroika:notas sobre la reuni6n
plenaria del Comite Sovietico de
Solaridad con los Pueblos de America Latina. America Latina (USSR),

v. 9 (September 1988), pp. 80-82.

New Directions in Soviet Policy
towards Latin America. Rodolfo
Cerdas Cruz.Journalof Latin American Studies, v. 21, Pt. 1 (February

1989), pp. 1-22.
Nueva etapa de cooperaci6n
econ6mica. Vadim Teperman. America

Latina (USSR), no. 1 (1989), pp. 9-12.
[About a new dawn in relations
between the countries of Eastern
Europe (CAME) and Latin
America.]

Perestroika and Problems of
Socialist Renewal: Compulsions,
Constraints, and Contradictions.
A. Roy. Economicand PoliticalWeekly,
v. 23, no. 52-53 (December 1988),
pp. 2745-54.
Reading between the Lines in
Havana. US. News and World Report,
v. 106, no. 15 (April 17, 1989), p. 494.
[What was said, and left unsaid,
during the conversation between
Mikhail Gorbachev and Fidel Castro
the week before.]

The Superpowers: Dance of the
Dinosaurs. Marshall D. Shulman.
ForeignAffairs (1988), p. 494. [Mentions Gorbachev's willingness to cut
military aid to Nicaragua under
certain conditions.]
Whose Man in Havana? The Nation,
v. 248, no. 16 (April 24, 1989), p. 541.
[Editorial about Castro's reactions
to Gorbachev's new ideas.]

Recent Books on the Region
Anthropology and Sociology
Academic Rebels in Chile: The Role
of Philosophy in Higher Education
and Philosophy. IvanJaksic.State
University of New York Press, 1989.

200 pp. $39.50; $12.95.
Derecho indigena y derechos
humanos en America Latina.
Rodolfo Stavenhagen. El Colegio de

Guinea's Other Suns: Essays on the
African Dynamic in Trinidad Culture. Maureen Warner-Lewis. Dover,

Mass.. Majority Press, 1989. 250 pp.
$9.95.
Hispanic Lands and Peoples:
Selected Writings ofJames Parsons.
William M. Denevan, ed. Westview

Press, 1989. 478 pp. $29.00.

M6xico, 1988. 383 pp. $13.00.
El Salvador: iglesia prof6tica y cambio social. PedroHenriquez. San
Jose: Departamento Ecum6nico de
Investigaciones, 1988. 272 pp.
The Flocks of the Wamani: A Study
of Llama Herders on the Punas of
Ayacucho, Peru. Kent V Flannery,
Joyce Marcus, Robert G. Reynolds.
Academic Press, 1989. 230 pp.
From Mafalda to Los Supermachos:
Latin American Graphic Humor as
Popular Culture. David William Foster Boulder, Colo.. Lynne Rienner,

1989. 119 pp. $20.95.

The Housing Lark. Samuel Selvon.
Three Continents Press, 1989.

155 pp. $1700. [About West Indians

La iglesia costarricense entre Dios y
el Cesar. Miguel Picado. San Jose:
Departamento Ecumenico de
Investigaciones, 1988. 160 pp.

A igreja no Brasil. EugenioDirceu

Keller Sao Paulo: FTD, 1989. 103 pp.
Incarnations of the Aztec
Supernatural: The Image of
Huitzilopochtli in Mexico and
Europe. Elizabeth H. Boone. American Philosophical Society, 1989.

in Great Britain.]
The Human Ecology of Tropical
Land Settlement in Latin America.
Debra A. Schumann, William L.
Partridge,eds. Westview Press, 1989.

385 pp. $29.95.
Ibo: Yorubas en tierras cubanas.
Rosalia de la Soledad, MariaJ.
Sanjuan de Novas. Miami: Ediciones
Universal, 1989. 284 pp. $19.95.

Kilowatts and Crisis: A Study of
Development and Social Change
in Panama. Alaka Wall. Westview

Press, 1989. 250 pp. $26.50. [Discusses the impact of the Bayano
Dam on indigenous groups.]
Livelihood and Resistance: A Study
of Peasants and the Politics of Land
in Peru. Gavin Smith. University of

California Press, 1989. 250 pp.
$3750.
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Publications Update

The Mexicans: A Personal Portrait
of a People. PatrickOster. New York:

W Morrow, 1989. 334 pp. $19.45.
Migrants in the Mexican North:
Mobility, Economy, and Society in a
Colonial World. Michael M. Swann.

Westview Press, 1989. 220 pp. $26.50.
Migrants to Amaz6nia: Spontaneous Colonization in the Brazilian
Frontier.Judith Lisansky. Westview
Press, 1989. 180 pp. $14.95.
Mujeres latinoamericanas: diez
ensayos y una historia colectiva.
Mariadel Carmen Feijo6, et al. Lima:

E TristAn, 1988. 308 pp. $12.95.
Panama: la Iglesia y la lucha de los
pobres. Andres Opazo Bernales. San
Jose: Departamento Ecumenico de
Investigaciones, 1988 214 pp.
Politica habitacional brasileira:
verso e reverso. Maria Ozanirada
Silva e Silva. Sao Paulo: Edit6ra

Cortez, 1989. 199 pp.
Potaje y otro mazote de estampas
cubanas.Jose Sdnchez-Boudy. Miami:
Ediciones Universal, 1989. 148 pp.
Si te quieres por el poco divertir...:
historia del preg6n musical latinoamericano. Crist6balDiaz Ayala. San
Juan: Editorial Cubanacan, 1989.

371 pp. $25.00.
Los silencios de la revoluci6n:
Chile, la otra cara de la modernizaci6n. Eugenio TironiBarrios. Santiago: Editorial Puerta Abierta,

1988. 135 pp. $740.
Social Change in Brazil, 1945-1985:
The Incomplete Transition. Edmar
L. Bacha, Herbert S. Stein, eds. University of New Mexico Press, 1989.

360 pp. $22.50.
State, Capital, and Rural Society:
Anthropological Perspectives on
Political Economy in Mexico and
the Andes. Benjamin S. Orlove,
Michael W. Foley, Thomas F Love, eds.

Westview Press, 1989. 350 pp. $34.50.
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Tramo ancla: ensayos puertorriquefios de hoy. Kalman Barsy, et al.
Ana Lydia Vega, ed. Rio Piedras:
Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1988.

Tiburcio Carias Andino, el fundador de la paz. Rafael Bardales.
San Pedro Sula, Honduras: Central

Impresora, 1989. 600 pp. $10.00.

305 pp.
With All and for the Good of All:
The Emergence of Popular Nationalism in the Cuban Communities of
the United States, 1848-1898. Gerald
Eugene Poyo. Duke University Press,

1989. 200 pp. $28.95.

Biography
The Admiral and His Lady: Columbus and Filipa of Portugal. Maria
De Freitas Treen. New York: R.
Speller, 1989. $1795. [Emphasizes
Columbus's association with Portugal and his marriage to a young
woman of Porto Santo.]
The Diario of Christopher Columbus's First Voyage to America,

1492-1493. Fray Bartolomb de las
Casas. Oliver Dunn,JamesE. Kelley,

Jr,eds. and trans. University of Oklahoma Press, 1989. 491 pp. $49.95.

Economics
Capital-Intensive Industries in
Newly Industrializing Countries:
The Case of the Brazilian Automobile and Steel Industries.
Bernhard Fischer et al. Westview

Press, 1989. 328 pp. $50.00.
Central America: The Future of
Economic Integration. George Irvin,
Stuart Holland, eds. Westview Press,

1989. 200 pp. $2750.
Debt, Adjustment and Recovery:
Latin America's Prospects for
Growth and Development. Sebastian
Edwards, FelipeLarrain,eds. New
York: B. Blackwell, 1989. 300 pp.

$45.00.
Deindustrialization in Chile.Jaime
GaticaBarrios. Westview Press, 1989.
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